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1. Preface 
During my years of studying I have increasingly become interested in the energy sector and its 
mechanisms. This interest has been strengthened by working in the energy sector, both in 
Schlumberger and in Statkraft AS, and by taking the course "Petroleum Economics" in the fall 
2005. 
 
In Europe, natural gas has traditionally been imported mainly by pipelines from Russia, Norway 
and to some extent from Algeria. The market for gas supplies to Europe has been stable and 
characterized by long-term agreements and bilateral political considerations. The imports have 
come in addition to substantial indigenous production. Recently, indigenous production has been 
falling, and together with increased consumption this has led to a supply gap. This supply gap and 
increased demand for flexibility have in turn given new actuality to the concept of liquefying the 
gas and transporting it as LNG. A major motivation for this paper is to analyze and discuss to what 
extent LNG will contribute to the European energy balance the coming decades. 
 
If LNG gains a significant role in the European energy balance, how will the current large suppliers 
be affected? Will the introduction of new gas suppliers alter the market power of the current 
suppliers? This market power has not been challenged by new entrants until now. Will increased 
use of LNG lead to increased competition between rivalling exporting countries, thus creating a 
freer market? Or may the new entrants have more incentives to collude, and create a cartel?    
 
I believe that predicting the future of LNG and understanding its potential impact on the market 
power of the current suppliers of gas to Europe is essential in order to predict and understand the 
energy market in Europe in the coming years. This is due to the important role natural gas is 
expected to play in power generation and because of the flexibility LNG offers. 
 
Thus, my research question becomes: "What is the future role of LNG in Europe and will increased 
use of LNG change the market power of the current gas suppliers?" 
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I have sought to answer this question by applying theoretical models, interviewing analysts and 
studying literature on the subject. This approach has enabled me to view the LNG-market from 
several angles and gain valuable insight into the dynamics and challenges in this market. Gathering 
exact information has been a challenge because of high degree of secrecy concerning prices and 
investments. 
 
I would like to thank my advisor and lecturer in Petroleum Economics, Røgnvaldur Hannesson, for 
his valuable feedback and inspiring lectures. I would also like to thank analysts and others who 
have provided input, especially Emmanuel Soetaert at Statkraft, Bjørn Brochmann at Pointcarbon 
and Lars-Ivar Berge at NHH.  
 
 
 
Oslo, May 2007 
 
 
 
Thomas Fredrik Palm 
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2. Executive summary 
Natural gas is today one of the fastest growing energy sources in the world. This is due to the fact 
that it is very convenient as it can be used by households directly, as fuel in engines or as fuel in 
flexible power generation. Moreover, higher energy prices and the focus on reducing CO2 emissions 
have made natural gas more attractive as a substitute for oil and coal.  
 
The driving forces for renewed interest in natural gas and LNG: 
• Increased demand for combined cycle power generation in order to meet growing electricity 
consumption. 
• Technological advances lead to cost reductions which make previously uneconomic LNG 
supply chains profitable. 
• Environmental concerns makes natural gas more attractive because CO2 prices rise. 
• LNG is a means for diversification as security of energy supply is becoming increasingly 
important.    
 
Europe produces substantial amounts of natural gas, but its production is declining. This makes 
Europe even more dependent on imports from the two regions with the largest reserves, the Middle 
East and Russia. Natural gas consumption in Europe is predicted to increase strongly the next 
decades. The increasing demand in Europe stems from the benefits of using natural gas in power 
generation and directly in households. Gas fired power plants emit less CO2 and are more flexible 
than the traditional coal power plants. There are currently three regional markets for gas, Europe, 
North America and East Asia.  
 
Natural gas can be transported either through pipelines or in liquid form on vessels, as LNG. LNG 
has become more popular in recent years because of its flexibility and the lack of exploitable gas 
reserves close to Europe. Furthermore, costs in the LNG value chain have decreased due to 
technological advances. 
 
LNG prices are closely linked to the price of fuel oil in the long-term, rigid contracts that 
characterize the market. Recently, LNG contracts have started to be of shorter duration and a small 
short-term market that is close to being a spot market has developed. 
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Security of supply is high on the agenda in Europe because of the increasing import dependency 
and the large market shares of especially Russia, and increasingly Algeria. LNG is supposed to play 
a significant role in improving security of supply through diversification. Countries like Qatar, 
Oman, Nigeria and Trinidad and Tobago are set to become significant exporters to the European 
market. 
 
Importers in Europe seem committed to increasing LNG-imports as they are making substantial 
investments in reception capacity. A condition for increased use of LNG in Europe is that Europe is 
able to compete with the other gas markets in attracting new supplies. Europe has a cost advantage 
over North America and East Asia when it comes to supplies from Africa and the Middle East, but 
the US will still be a serious competitor because of its strong gas demand and political and financial 
power. 
 
Russia, Norway and Algeria are characterized by selling most of their gas through large partly- or 
fully state-owned companies. The companies, Gazprom, Sonatrach and StatoilHydro, have very 
substantial power over the gas exports from their respective countries. 
 
Russia, Algeria and Norway do not engage in formal price coordination and there is little evidence 
that they have coordinated policies. However, it is clear that they do enjoy some oligopoly power 
and that especially Russia is in the position of exploiting this power. 
 
The lessons learned from the OPEC cartel in the oil market, show that cartelization in a market with 
inelastic supply and demand may be very profitable if a significant part of the producers join and 
the internal discipline is strong. The history of OPEC also shows that in the long term substitution 
will lead to loss of power if cartels drive prices to high. 
 
Increased use of LNG may reduce the oligopoly power of the current suppliers by increased 
flexibility in choosing supplier and especially by reducing the current suppliers’ market share if 
significant volumes of gas are being imported as LNG. However, increased use of LNG may lead to 
more market power in the hands of the suppliers. There is a possibility that the LNG exporters may 
organize a cartel much like the OPEC cartel, but with a larger part of total output in the cartel. 
Because there are substitutes to gas both in the short-term and in the long-term, a gas cartel will 
probably be relatively short-lived, although being able to control prices for some time.     
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3. Introduction 
In this thesis I will seek to answer my research question which is "What is the future role of LNG in 
Europe and will increased use of LNG change the market power of the current gas suppliers?" I will 
start by providing a background for the discussion. I will briefly cover the basics of natural gas, the 
basics of LNG, and natural gas and LNG in Europe specifically. These parts will be the basis for 
discussing the research question. 
 
In order to analyze the future of LNG in Europe I will structure the discussion as follows: First, 
there will have to be demand for LNG. This will have to come from increased demand for natural 
gas, as LNG only is a way to transport natural gas. Natural gas will need to be attractive compared 
to other energy sources. Furthermore, some part of the increased gas volumes must be transported 
as LNG instead of by pipelines. Finally, Europe must offer sufficient reception capacity for LNG. 
 
Second, there will have to be supply of LNG. New gas fields must be developed in places where 
LNG transportation is superior to pipeline transportation. LNG may be superior to pipelines for 
economic reasons or for reasons of security of supply. Furthermore, a certain part of the new LNG 
supplies will have to be destined for Europe. Europe must be able to compete with North America 
and the industrialized countries of East Asia in order for LNG to gain increased importance in 
Europe. 
 
In the last part of the thesis I will analyze the potential impact of LNG on the market power of the 
suppliers of gas to the European market. In order to do this I will first consider the current 
characteristics of the supplies from Russia, Algeria and Norway. I will relate the situation to theory 
of oligopoly power and use OPEC as an example of cartelization in the energy market. I will 
continue by discussing whether these countries have and use market power when supplying Europe 
with gas, and if potential new suppliers may gain market power. To gain insight into this matter I 
will study literature on the subject and interview analysts.  
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In order to limit this paper I will not treat the internal workings of the European gas market, 
including regulation and company structure. I will neither include peripheral subjects such as the 
LNG shipping market and the Kyoto protocol. When subjects like these influence the discussion I 
will make commonly accepted assumptions. 
 
I would like to emphasize some of the key assumptions I have made in this paper. 
 
Firstly, in this paper I define Europe as being Western Europe, i.e. EU15 and Switzerland. On some 
occasions and in some statistics I may deviate from this definition, but only when deviations are of 
insignificant importance for the result. Norway will not be treated as a part of Europe in most 
contexts. 
 
Secondly, I will treat LNG only, and not include LPG1 or NGL2.  
 
Finally, when analyzing the potential development of the market power of the suppliers, I will look 
at the supplying countries, not companies. As most gas exporting companies are state-owned these 
approaches will mainly coincide. 
 
A list of abbreviations is to be found in appendix 11.1. 
 
 
 
                                                 
1 Liquid Pressurized Gas 
2 Natural Gas Liquids 
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4. Basics of natural gas 
In order to be able to analyze the research question it is necessary with an overview of natural gas. 
Important topics to be covered include production, consumption and total reserves. Furthermore, the 
two main transportation modes and a brief overview of gas prices are presented. 
4.1. Definitions and chemical composition 
Natural gas is the product of what was once organic material. After millions of years in high 
temperatures and under very high pressure, this material has been transformed into fossil fuels like 
coal, oil and natural gas. The deeper underground one drills, the more natural gas relative to oil one 
finds, and in the deepest wells one can find pure natural gas.3  
 
Natural gas is a colourless and odourless gas of hydrocarbons where methane is the primary 
component. It usually contains other gases as well, where ethane, propane, butane, pentane and 
hexane are the most common.  
 
Natural gas is classified as “wet” or “dry” depending on the level of liquid components at 
atmospheric pressure. Wet gas contains mainly ethane, propane and butane. The last two are 
components of crude oil and called LPG (Liquefied Petroleum Gas). Wet gas is often sold as 
Natural Gas Liquids (NGL). Dry gas consists almost exclusively of methane, and does not contain 
any liquid components. This gas is either transported through pipelines or stored in tanks. When 
stored and transported in tanks, the gas is either compressed (CNG)4 or liquefied (LNG).5  
 
While crude oil is mainly measured in barrels, the volume of natural gas is measured in a number of 
ways, e.g. cubic feet, tons, oil equivalents and cubic meters. In this paper I will mainly use cubic 
meters.  
 
                                                 
3 Naturalgas.org 
4 Compressed Natural Gas 
5 NVE (2004) 
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4.2. Reserves and production 
Natural gas is often found together with oil in deep oil wells. There are also pure gas fields that only 
produce natural gas. Where oil and gas are found together, the gas is separated from the oil and 
taken to the processing plant. There, the gas is “dried” i.e. the dry gas is separated from the wet gas 
and other components. The different products are then transported by pipeline or ship to the 
receiving terminals, from where it is distributed to the end users. 
 
The supply of gas is determined by several factors. The price the producer expects to get in the 
market is clearly important when deciding whether to invest in gas extraction or not. Price 
expectations also affect the level of exploration and research. Then there are technological barriers 
which make some discovered fields uneconomic. As the reserves of natural gas are finite, there will 
be increasingly less gas left. The gas which is easiest to extract will be extracted first, which means 
that new production capacity will be more expensive than the current. However, the total amount of 
gas in the world is not known, and new discoveries of gas fields which are uncomplicated to 
develop may increase supply. 
 
Natural gas is found and produced in many parts of the world, but the reserves are very unevenly 
spread across the globe. As can be seen below, Russia and the Middle East hold most of the world’s 
known reserves. It is worth noticing that these numbers are proved reserves. In many Middle East 
countries natural gas has until now been regarded as merely a bi-product of oil and these countries 
have not explored their reserves extensively. The European and North American countries have 
explored their territories thoroughly as their R/P-ratio has declined. This may imply that the 
reserves of the Middle East countries and Russia may be even greater relative to those of Europe 
and North America than showed in the table below.  
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Reserves and R/P-ratios  
Country Tcm Share of total R/P-ratio 
Russia 47.82 26.6% 80.0 
Iran 26.74 14.9% Over 100 
Qatar 25.78 14.3% Over 100 
Saudi Arabia 6.90 3.8% 99.3 
UAE 6.04 3.4% Over 100 
USA 5.45 3.0% 10.4 
Nigeria 5.23 2.9% Over 100 
Algeria 4.58 2.5% 52.2 
- - - - 
EU25 2.57 1.4% 12.9 
Norway 2.41 1.3% 28.3 
(BP statistical review of world energy 2006) 
 
As seen in the table above, Europe holds very modest reserves compared to total world reserves. It 
is worth noticing that Norway holds close to half of European reserves. Russia has over one-quarter 
of total world reserves, which shows how important Russia is as a natural gas supplier. The Middle 
East has 72.13 Tcm (40.1%) and Africa has 14.39 Tcm (8.0%) of total world reserves.  
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When looking at the main producers of natural gas, one finds that these are not necessarily the same 
as those with the largest reserves. Russia and USA are by far the largest producers, although the  
American production is decreasing relatively rapidly.  
 
Production 
Country bcm/ year Share of total 
Russia 598.0 21.6% 
USA 525.7 19.0% 
Canada 185.5 6.7% 
UK 88.0 3.2% 
Algeria 87.8 3.2% 
Iran 87.0 3.1% 
Norway 85.0 3.1% 
- - - 
Netherlands 62.9 2.3% 
EU25 199.7 7.2% 
(BP statistical review of world energy 2006) 
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4.3. Consumption 
Natural gas is very flexible in its use, and can be used directly for heating and cooking, or in 
engines, fuel cells or power generation. One can distinguish between gas use in households, power 
generation, and industrial use. Households use gas from pipes or containers as a substitute for 
electricity in cooking and heating. Using natural gas in power generation has been increasingly 
widespread as it emits far less CO2 and toxic gases than oil and in particular coal. A gas power plant 
emits approximately half of the CO2 that a coal fired plant emits. Gas fired power stations also have 
the advantage of being flexible regarding output, and are thus suited for producing peak load, which 
means they can charge higher prices than base load producers. Natural gas is also used directly as 
fuel in cars, buses and boats. Natural gas is an important raw material in production of certain 
chemicals and fertilizers. 
 
The use of gas varies widely between countries. As can be seen from the table below, USA is by far 
the largest consumer of natural gas today. The European countries consume large amounts as well 
and far more than they produce. 
 
 
Consumption 
Country bcm Share of total 
USA 633.5 23.0% 
Russia 405.1 14.7% 
UK 94.6 3.4% 
Canada 91.4 3.3% 
Iran 88.5 3.2% 
Germany 85.9 3.1% 
Japan 81.1 2.9% 
Italy 79.9 2.9% 
- - - 
EU25 471.2 17.1% 
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4.4. Modes of transportation 
Transporting large amounts of gas over long distances can be done in two ways, either by pipelines 
or in liquefied form by ship. Both solutions are very capital intensive and require a large and stable 
production to be economically feasible. 
 
When constructing a pipeline, total costs will grow almost linearly with distance and there will be 
small fixed costs that are not related to distance. The major cost component of a pipeline project is 
the pipeline itself. While there are no economies of scale with respect to distance, there are 
substantial economic benefits from constructing pipeline with larger diameter. The total costs of 
constructing a 20" pipeline and a 40" pipeline are relatively similar, but the latter will have far less 
costs per unit of transportation capacity as it may transport four times as much.6 Offshore pipelines 
are generally more expensive than onshore pipelines. 
 
In LNG, the main cost component is the liquefaction. The shipping operation accounts for between 
30 and 40 percent of total transportation costs, while the remaining are fixed capital costs related to 
liquefaction and regasification. LNG transportation costs will increase with distance, but not as 
much as pipeline costs. The reason for this is that when the distance increases the fixed costs of 
liquefaction and regasification are spread over more kilometres. 
 
The result is that pipeline is more favourable than LNG on shorter distances while LNG is superior 
to pipelines for longer distances. 
 
                                                 
6 A doubling of the diametre will give a fourfold capacity increase because the capacity is given by the area of the 
cross-section which in turn is given by the formula A=π * r2 
 13
Transportation costs
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The figure shows the transportation costs for different modes of transportation for different 
distances. LP means Low Pressure and HP means High Pressure. The number in brackets is the 
amount of gas in bcm that is delivered per year. It is important to notice that the volume carried by 
LNG is much smaller than the volume carried by most of the pipelines in this figure.  
 
Approximate distances (by sea) presented for illustration: 
Arzev (Algeria) – Barcelona (Spain): 450km 
Skikda (Algeria) – Rome (Italy): 600km 
Qatar – Barcelona (Spain): 7400km 
Troll (Norway) – Zeebrugge (Belgium): 800km 
Arzev (Algeria) – London (UK): 2250km 
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4.5. Pricing   
Natural gas competes with fuels such as coal, oil and nuclear power. In the longer term, natural gas 
may be substituted by these fuels in electricity generation, and the electricity may substitute 
household consumption of gas. In the medium term power plants can switch between oil, gas and 
coal. This makes the gas price dependent on the price of other fossil fuels.  
 
In practice most gas is sold in fixed contracts with the price being formally linked to the price of 
fuel oil / light heating oil. Therefore, the gas price is especially tightly linked to the oil price. Still it 
varies between regions and countries, although the trends are the same, as can be seen in the figure 
below. 
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(Based on price series from BP Statistical Review 2006) 
 
Until 2002, European and American gas prices followed each other. From 2002 the price 
differential increased as American prices soared more than European. Although not shown in the 
figure, prices have converged the last two years. 
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5. Basics of LNG 
This chapter will treat LNG specifically, and analyze the different parts of the LNG value chain and 
the cost structure of the value chain. This will be an important basis for the analysis of investments 
in LNG. This chapter will also include an overview of the market structure and market mechanisms. 
5.1. Technical specifications and concept 
At -162 degrees Celsius at atmospheric pressure, natural gas (methane) will condensate and become 
an odourless, clear, non-toxic and non-corrosive liquid. It is then 600 times more compressed than it 
is in gas form.7 Because of this reduction in volume, liquid gas can be transported in tanks at a 
competitive cost. Shipping LNG by sea is the only viable way to transport the natural gas over 
distances and areas where pipeline transport is impossible. LNG is also used for flexibility purposes 
in connection with pipelines, so-called peak-shaving facilities. In these facilities some of the gas is 
liquefied and stored, in order to be able to supply more than the production when demand is 
particularly high. 
 
In the early stages of the LNG development there were concerns over the potential hazards of 
transporting large amounts of explosive gas. However, methane is lighter than air and burns only 
when the concentration is 5% – 15% of air. Because of this, the gas will be dispersed into the 
atmosphere in the event of leakage, and the probability of an explosion is rather low. There have not 
been any serious accidents, partly due to the very strict safety regulations. There have been only two 
groundings, one collision and one breakdown involving LNG-vessels, none of them causing 
pollution. 
 
5.2. Value chain 
When the natural gas has been extracted from the well, the gas is taken to a reception terminal by 
pipeline, either offshore or onshore. From there it is either distributed by pipeline, using powerful 
compressors, or liquefied. I will now examine the LNG value chain from the liquefaction process to 
the pipelines of the importing country. 
 
                                                 
7 BP.com (2006) 
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5.2.1. The liquefaction process 
The liquefaction process takes place in a condensation plant where the natural gas is cooled to 
approximately -162°C. The wet gas is first treated in order to remove water and other substances 
like mercury and carbon dioxide. Next, the gas is cooled to -35°C to separate the heavier hydrogen 
atoms from the methane. This step is not done for pipeline gas, making LNG “cleaner”, i.e. with 
higher methane content than pipeline gas. Finally, the gas is cooled to -162°C. There are two main 
technologies used in liquefaction today, namely Air Products (APCI) and the Phillips cascade 
technology.8  
 
The liquefaction process requires large amounts of energy, and between 5 and 15% of the gas is 
used in the plant during the cooling process.9 Liquefaction is done in what is called “trains”, which 
are relatively separate production units. One train usually produces approximately 3 mtpa (Million 
Tons Per Annum) of LNG.10 Until recently, trains with a capacity of 4 mtpa have been considered 
very large, but recently several trains of this size and larger have been designed. (Bechtel) In March 
2004 the largest train in the world was train nr 4 in Port Fortin, Trinidad, with a capacity of 5.2 
mtpa.11 However, the size of trains is assumed to increase in the near future. Conoco Phillips and 
Bechtel Corporation believe that 8 mtpa trains are both technically and economically feasible. 
  
5.2.2. LNG-shipping 
LNG is mainly transported using specialized vessels which are purpose built for carrying LNG. The 
double hull vessels are fitted with 4-7 large insulated tanks which are constructed so that the loss of 
gas because of vaporisation is limited. Some loss by vaporisation will occur, but usually this is used 
as fuel for the ship. The vessels are complex and expensive structures compared to oil tankers, 
especially because of the LNG tanks and strict safety regulations. Earlier LNG vessels were 
produced mainly in western European yards because of the complexity involved, but today low cost 
producers such as South Korea have captured a significant market share and the entry of South 
Korea and possibly other low-cost producers lowers new-building prices.  
 
                                                 
8 Weems (2000) 
9 NVE (2004) 
10 Bechtel (2007) 
11 Bechtel (2007) 
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From the early start of LNG shipping the size of the ships has increased and the most widely used 
ships now carry 130,000 cubic meters. Vessels with a capacity of 265,000 cubic meters are 
currently under construction.12 This increase in size facilitates the realisation of economies of scale, 
but at the same time limits the vessels to certain trades with large ports, high volumes and/or large 
storage facilities. Due to vaporization and the high capital costs, the speed of LNG-vessels is high 
compared to ordinary vessels with a speed of 20knots. Loading and unloading are also fast, taking 
around 12 – 18 hours. 
 
The LNG fleet is currently made up by 179 vessels worldwide; with a total capacity of 25.1mcm.13  
Due to the rapid expansion of LNG facilities, there were 130 vessels under construction or in the 
order book by the end of 2005, and Drewry Shipping expects the number of LNG carriers to surpass 
400 in 2011 or 2012.14 An important aspect of the economics of shipping is the supply lag of new-
buildings. The delivery time for an LNG vessel varies with the general shipping cycles and thus the 
capacity at the yards. 
  
An arrangement where the shipper owns the ship himself has been common in LNG shipping 
because of an almost non-existent spot market and high investment costs. Lately, several pure 
shipping companies like Golar LNG and Bergesen have been investing in LNG carriers and renting 
them out on time charter.  
 
In some cases the LNG seller takes responsibility for the cargo until it is unloaded at the reception 
terminal, while in other cases it is sold as a so-called FOB which means Free on Board. The latter 
means that the gas is sold when it moves from the liquefaction plant to the ship. This is becoming 
increasingly popular among buyers. 
 
                                                 
12 QMax LNG carriers ordered from South Korean yards for use in export from Qatar. Source: EIA 
13 EIA (2006) and Shell (2007) 
14 Shipping Economics, Lecture Notes 
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5.2.3. Regasification and storage 
In the regasification plant the liquid gas is heated and made gaseous again. There are several 
technologies used for this purpose, the most usual being direct-fired heaters and heating by passing 
the gas through pipes submerged in seawater or heated water. This process requires energy, but 
significantly less than for liquefaction. Large compressors are used to pump the gas into the 
pipelines. 
 
The plant contains storage facilities with insulated tanks where the LNG is stored in order to be able 
to distribute the gas smoothly on to the consumers. The storage capacity varies significantly 
between regasification plants and this capacity is a main cost driver for a reception terminal. 
Sometimes ships are used for storage as well. 
 
Storage capacity is vital in order to be able to cover peak demand and/or minor disruptions in 
deliveries. However, there will typically be storage facilities further on in the distribution chain, like 
depleted reservoirs in connection with the pipeline system.  
  
New regasification technologies are being developed, among these, on-board regasification. This 
means that the LNG is being transformed to gas on the ship and can be pumped directly into the 
pipeline network, removing the need for on-shore regasification facilities. Furthermore, there are 
plans for floating offshore regasification terminals and for using pressurized gas. The latter solution 
would involve the possibility of transferring the gas directly into the grid system. On-board 
regasification would probably lower costs significantly, as well as increase flexibility, as it would 
reduce the need for on-shore regasification terminals with long lead times and fixed costs. The 
experts disagree over the future impact of on-board regasification technology. 
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The Gas / LNG value chain: 
  
 
 
Upstream 
LNG chain 
Downstream 
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5.3. Cost structure 
The cost structure of the LNG value chain has important implications for the market mechanisms. 
The cost distribution along the value chain will vary among different projects because of differences 
in factors such as physical and geographical conditions, distance to market and government 
regulations and subsidies. The numbers provided in this section should thus be seen as a rough 
estimation. As the upstream and downstream operations, i.e. field development and distribution and 
marketing are the same for LNG and pipeline gas, I will not cover these parts specifically.  
 
LNG chain costs (million USD)
Liquefaction
47 %
Shipping
38 %
Regasification
15 %
 
(Figure based on numbers from Clingendael) 
 
Step Costs (million USD) 
Liquefaction 900 – 1200 
Shipping 850 – 950 
Regasification 300 – 400 
Total 2050 – 2550 
(Clingendael, 2003) 
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5.3.1. Liquefaction 
A greenfield plant with one train of approximately 4 mtpa capacity has an average cost of USD 
1bn.15 Operating costs normally constitute less than 5% of total capital costs pr year.16 Of the 
operating expenses, the internal gas consumption constitutes the main part. There are significant 
economies of scale to be realized in the liquefaction process. In the normal case, a plant with two 
trains has 20% lower unit costs than a one-train-plant, according to Harang (2002). Furthermore, 
during the last two decades significant economies of scale have been realised through increasing the 
size of the trains and storage tanks.17 
 
A substantial part of the expected capacity increases in liquefaction plants the coming years is 
achieved through expansion of existing plants. Expansion projects normally have between a 30% to 
40% cost advantage over greenfield projects.  
 
The liquefaction process will typically account for 50% or more of the total cost of bringing the gas 
to market by LNG.18 
 
5.3.2. Shipping 
LNG carriers are subject to strict safety regulations and are complicated to construct, bringing the 
cost of a new vessel (138,000cm) to around $150million. This is more than twice the cost of an oil 
tanker which is carrying between 4 and 5 times more energy.19 However, the price of a new LNG-
vessel has been nearly halved the last decade. This has been due to several factors, like 
technological development and the entry of South Korean yards in the LNG segment. Because of 
the volatile nature of shipping, prices will vary considerably. According to Bakkelund and 
Sørensen, operating costs for a standard LNG vessel (new 130,000cm) will be roughly USD 16 
million per year for a 3000 miles loaded voyage. With China positioning itself as a major ship-
builder it seems likely that they can drive the prices of new LNG vessels even further down. 
 
                                                 
15 IEA (2002) 
16 Harang (2002) 
17 Bakkelund and Sørensen (2002) 
18 Harang (2002) 
19 EIA (2006) 
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The main cost driver regarding the shipping operation is the distance to the market. The larger the 
distance, the more vessels are needed, thus increasing the financing cost and depreciation cost of the 
fleet. While the supply of 5 mtpa from Nigeria to Europe would require between 5 and 6 vessels, a 
similar supply from Algeria would only call for two vessels. 
 
While the shipping operation constitutes around 10% of the delivered value of oil, it takes up 
between 10% and 30% of the value of natural gas. The transport cost of LNG is a function of the 
distance, and the capacity of the vessel. Larger vessels can reduce the unit cost significantly, and the 
average vessel size is indeed increasing. 
 
5.3.3. Regasification 
The regasification plant is less expensive than the liquefaction plant. According to Bakkelund and 
Sørensen, a regasification terminal with a capacity of between 3 and 6 mtpa may cost anything from 
USD 100 million to USD 500 million. Moreover, a 3.3 mtpa terminal with 200,000cbm storage 
capacity will have operating costs of around USD 14 million annually.20 In the reception terminals, 
storage capacity is the main cost driver. There is a trend of constructing larger storage tanks, 
making it possible to reap the benefits of economies of scale.  
 
                                                 
20 Bakkelund and Sørensen (2002) 
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5.4. Regional markets 
While the market for oil is a truly global market, the gas market has traditionally been divided in 
three distinct regions. The Asian market is by far the largest, representing 70% of the worldwide 
market. Japan and South Korea are the two largest LNG importers of the world, importing 81 bcm 
and 30 bcm respectively.21 China and India are expected to show significant growth and become 
major importers during the next decade, according to the predictions in the EIA Energy Outlook. 
Japan has been driving LNG development as it is an island nation with huge energy demand, few 
domestic resources and few possibilities for pipeline imports. The major producers supplying this 
market are Indonesia, Malaysia and Australia. Increasingly, some Middle East producers are 
starting to export to the Asian market. 
 
The European market is the second largest. Demand for LNG has been steadily increasing during 
the last decade. Spain has been one of the countries driving the development, and it is expected that 
the strong demand growth will continue. Main suppliers include Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Qatar. 
 
The North American market is also growing, but the growth has been limited until now because of a 
lack of infrastructure. As of now, the market is small compared to Asia and Europe, and 
insignificant for the total energy supply. In 2005, LNG only accounted for 2.5% of total US gas 
supply. It is expected that LNG imports to the US will double between 2005 and 2010. 
 
As noted earlier, these regional gas markets have traditionally been separate. However, with the 
increase in LNG production, the gas markets have been brought closer together. Several of the new 
and significant LNG producers are located so that they quite easily can supply more than one 
region. Middle East producers link European and Asian prices as the distance to the European 
market and the Asian market is quite similar. Moreover, Middle East producers can supply the US 
East Coast, thus linking all three markets. Examples of this are Qatar, Algeria and Egypt which all 
supplied all three regions in 2005.22 As the producers gain more options regarding who to sell to, 
                                                 
21 IEA (2006) 
22 Some of the delivered volumes were small, but many producers in the Middle East and Northern Africa supplied 
substantial volumes to two different regions. 
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the customers gain flexibility as well. As can be seen in the appendix (11.4), Spain imported LNG 
from sources from all over the world like Oman, Trinidad and even Australia.23 
 
In the Atlantic basin, producers like Trinidad and Algeria sell to both Europe and North America.24  
 
(Based on map from IEA World Energy Outlook 2004) 
 
This map shows the intraregional trade flows of natural gas in bcm. One should note how Middle 
East producers supply Asia, Europe and North America. 
 
                                                 
23 Imports from Australia were only 0.08bcm, but still it shows that in certain instances it is economically viable to 
transport LNG over long distances. 
24 BP Statistical Review (2006) 
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5.5. Market mechanisms and contracts 
Because of the complexity and high costs associated with setting up the value chain of LNG, long-
term contracts and vertical integration has been the rule of the game in the LNG industry. For 
example, LNG vessels have traditionally operated on fixed contracts and often been partly or fully 
owned by the oil companies. The oil companies have also constructed the liquefaction plants in co-
operation with construction companies and the host government. The reception terminals have 
usually been owned and operated by the buyer, e.g. a power producer. 
 
Most LNG projects include the entire value chain, and are thus dependent upon the successful 
completion and functioning of all the elements in the chain. Securing that all participants have the 
financial backbone to realize the project, and coordinating the various elements are important for 
the success of a project. A delay in one part will often cause a delay in all parts of the chain, 
creating substantial losses.25 
 
The contracts in the LNG chain have typically tied up almost all capacity of the different parts of 
the chain. The concept of “Take-or-pay” contracts (TOP) has been very common. “Take-or-pay” 
means that the buyer can choose not to receive the gas, but he will nonetheless have to pay for all of 
or most of the contracted volume. 
 
Long-term contracts have been important to reduce risk in the early stage of the LNG industry, and 
until five years ago contracts of 20-25 years were the standard. As noted earlier, the investment 
required for setting up the whole chain is formidable, and risk reducing has therefore been of 
paramount importance. It has, however, reduced the flexibility of the market. Price signals have 
been unclear as the amount of LNG traded on spot or on a short term basis has been highly limited. 
 
Cost reductions due to technological advances have boosted the number of LNG projects. With the 
increasing number of liquefaction and reception terminals, a short-term market has been developing 
over the recent years. The short-term market was triggered during the Asian crisis when there was 
surplus capacity in East Asia and high prices in the US. 
 
                                                 
25 An example of this is the delay in the construction of a reception plant in Taiwan in 1990, which delayed the 
Indonesian Train E and the shipping operation. (Weems 2000) 
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A sign of the developing short-term market for LNG is that more ships are currently being ordered 
and constructed without being tied to any specific project. The volume of short-term traded LNG 
constituted 8.9% of total traded volume of LNG in 2003, up from 1.5% in 1997.26 Although the 
short-term traded volume is small compared to total consumption it creates flexibility in the market.  
 
New projects still use long-term contracts and no project has yet been done with the intention of 
supplying on a spot / short-term basis. However, there is a tendency towards shorter contracts 
because this is demanded by customers, but at the same time contracts are becoming less flexible. It 
remains to be seen if these contracts are replaced by new ones when they expire or whether some 
producers will choose to sell on a short-term basis. 
 
Some analysts draw the comparison to the development of the oil market. Earlier it was common 
for the oil companies to control a large part of the value chain, like the shipping operation. 
However, at a certain point in time it seems like the market gained sufficient size and flexibility, 
and the oil companies left the shipping operation to specialized shipping companies. The same 
development may take place in the LNG business as well, and recently there have been signs of 
this. According to Hallouche (2006) a spot market based in Zeebrugge, Belgium is developing. 
Shipping companies have been ordering LNG vessels without having a freight contract in place and 
the oil companies have been using shipping companies instead of own operations. 
 
However, many analysts doubt that the LNG-market will ever develop into a spot market like that 
of crude oil. Jensen (2006) argues that the LNG market will never be as flexible as the oil market 
because of the high costs of LNG transportation compared to the costs of oil transportation. He 
claims that LNG will only be able to compete in distant markets in the case of over-supply. In such 
a situation distant suppliers will supply on a marginal cost basis, not on the basis of long term 
profitability. Emmanuel Soetaert, Gas Analyst in Statkraft AS is of the same opinion and predicts 
that contracts will become more flexible and of shorter duration, but not disappear. The main 
argument is that the LNG value chain is too capital intensive to become a market without long-term 
contracts. 
                                                 
26 Jensen (2004) 
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5.6. Pricing 
LNG-prices are rarely made public as they are usually part of large bilateral contracts. Traditionally, 
the price has been linked to the price of fuel oil, not the price of gas, and this is still the most widely 
used practice in Europe. Most of the volume of LNG is sold under long-term contracts at price 
determined through negotiations and indexed to the price of fuel oil. Moreover, the Algerian FOB 
price is an important determinant of the LNG price in Europe, according to Tractebel. 
 
It is unclear how the LNG-prices have developed, and whether there is a price differential between 
Europe and USA, but LNG and gas prices should be linked indirectly through the oil price, and in 
theory there should not be large price differences except temporarily during extreme weather. 
However, the market is far from perfect and in practice it is often difficult to divert LNG to high 
price areas, and volumes are small. This creates strange price relationships like in 2005 when the 
price of LNG in Japan was $6.05, while the price of gas at the Henry Hub in the US was $8.79.27  
Because the short-term LNG-market is small, short-term prices can vary intensely. 
                                                 
27 BP Statistical Review (2006) 
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6. Natural gas and LNG in Europe today 
An overview of over current production, imports and consumption in Europe is provided in this 
chapter. Understanding the current supply and use of gas in Europe is essential for analyzing the 
potential for increased use of natural gas in the future, and the potential share supplied as LNG. 
Current security of supply issues will be covered, as supply diversification is considered one of the 
most important advantages of LNG compared to pipeline gas. 
6.1. History of natural gas and LNG in Europe28 
The history of natural gas in Europe started with the discovery of the Groningen field in the 
Netherlands in 1959. Later, gas fields were discovered and developed on the British shelf. In 1965 
Britain and France both started importing LNG from Algeria. Spain and Italy followed in 1970 by 
starting to import LNG from Libya. In the mid-60s Algeria started exporting natural gas through 
pipelines to the European continent, and during the 70s pipelines brought gas from the Soviet Union 
and Norway to continental Europe. The late 1990s and the first years of the new millennium saw a 
strengthened focus on LNG as new producers such as Nigeria and Trinidad came on stream. Nigeria 
intended to supply France, Italy, Portugal, Spain and Turkey, while the Port Fortin plant in Trinidad 
would ship part of its production to Spain. Spain also started receiving LNG from Qatar. Norway 
and Algeria strengthened their position by constructing more pipelines.  
 
                                                 
28 If not further commented, this chapter is based on BP.com  
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6.2. Consumption 
I will divide European gas consumption in power generation and household, commercial and 
industry consumption. Industry consumption is consumption in the chemical industry like e.g. 
fertilizer producers. Gas demand for power generation is demand for gas which is used in gas fired 
power plants to produce electricity, which is then used in households, offices and heavy industry. I 
will focus on gas for power generation as this is where the largest consumption increase is expected. 
European gas consumption grew by 3.7% pa from 1973 to 2000.  
 
6.2.1. Power generation 
Today, power generation consumes around ¼ of the natural gas consumption in Europe, according 
to the American Energy Information Administration (EIA). In 2003 natural gas accounted for 14% 
of the energy used for electricity generation. 
 
Natural gas emits significantly less CO2 per energy unit than coal does, and it is faster and easier to 
regulate output from a gas-fired power plant than from coal-fired or nuclear power plant. 
 
Substituting old coal fired power plants with new gas power plants will be one of the most 
important ways to fulfil the obligations of the Kyoto protocol. Currently, a coal-fired power plant 
emits 850kg CO2 / Mwh, while a gas-fired power plant emits 300kg CO2 / Mwh.29 With equal CO2 
taxes, this will obviously make coal less financially attractive. Recently, the EU commission has 
proposed even more radical cuts in CO2 emissions, and these cuts will imply a shift from coal to gas 
and nuclear power in Europe. Currently, the proposals and new regulations regarding CO2 emissions 
and quotas create uncertainty when considering new investments. The price of CO2 quotas is a 
major component of the marginal cost of coal fired power plants, and as the price on emissions 
varies widely, the marginal cost varies widely, which in turn creates unstable conditions for 
investments.  
 
                                                 
29 Numbers are approximations for average plants and for illustration only.  
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The price on CO2 quotas in the ETS (Emission Trading Scheme) was approximately 7 €/ton in the 
beginning of 2005. The price surged to 30 €/ton in July the same year, but has dropped to 
practically zero in early 2007. This decline is due to over-allocation of quotas for 2007, and prices 
may rise again next year when the EU decides on the number of quotas to be allocated then. This 
uncertainty makes it difficult to predict which fuel sources that will prevail in Europe the coming 
years. Analysts predict that the price of the CO2 quotas needs to be 30€ before it is profitable to 
switch from coal to gas.30 
 
There are strong differences in the use of gas for power generation between the Western European 
countries. The UK has for some time used natural gas extensively as fuel for base-load production, 
while other countries have used it to a lesser degree mainly for peak-load purposes. Spain 
completed ten new gas-fired power plants in 2004 with a total output of 8400MW. Over the last five 
years gas consumption in Spain has risen by 14% annually (cumulative annual growth rate).31 LNG 
constituted 62% of Iberian gas consumption in 2005.32 Due to favourable incentive mechanisms 
from the government, the use of wind power is increasing in countries like Spain and Germany. As 
wind power generation is unreliable, this increases the need for easily regulated capacity, which 
means gas power. 
 
6.2.2. Household and industry consumption 
Most Western European countries have an extensive gas grid for household use.33 The gas is used 
directly for heating and cooking instead of first transforming the energy to electricity. Direct 
household and commercial consumption account for 40% of total gas consumption.34  
                                                 
30 Statkraft Presentation (2007) 
31 The World Energy Book (2006) 
32 The World Energy Book (2006) 
33 An exception is Norway which, despite abundant gas reserves, does not use gas directly in household consumption. 
This is due to the traditionally low electricity prices. 
34 IEA (2002) 
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6.3. Supply 
In this section I will treat how Europe currently is supplied with natural gas. I will divide supplies in 
three, indigenous supply, pipeline imports and LNG imports. 
6.3.1. Indigenous supply 
The UK is the largest producer of natural gas within the EU with a production of 92.0 bcm in 2005, 
down from 111.2 bcm in 2001.35 The production is solely offshore production in the North Sea and 
most of the fields are in a mature phase.  
 
The very large gas field Groningen made the Netherlands an important gas supplier. This field has 
now been in production for approximately 40 years. Production has been fairly stable the last 
decades with a production of 78.8 bcm in 2005. The Netherlands export over half of their 
production to other European countries. 
 
Germany, Italy and Denmark also produce certain amounts of natural gas with 19.9, 12.0 and 10.4 
bcm respectively in 2005.36  
 
Norwegian production increased by 60% between 2000 and 2005. Production reached 89.6 bcm in 
2005. According to the Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy, Norway exported 82.5 bcm 
in 2005. Norway exports 30% of its gas production to Germany, 18.8% to Britain and 19.3% to 
France. The new offshore gas pipeline “Langeled” supplies the UK with 80 mcm of gas per day 
from the Ormen Lange field, which equals 29.2 bcm a year.37  
 
The R/P-ratio for OECD Europe has been relatively stable at 20 years the last years due to new 
discoveries in the North Sea and in the Norwegian Sea.38 Norwegian authorities believe there are 
5000 bcm of recoverable reserves left on the Norwegian shelf, of which Troll contains 1085 bcm, 
Ormen Lange contains 375 bcm and Snøhvit contains 160 bcm.39 The proved reserves are 2410 bcm 
according to BP.40  
                                                 
35 IEA (2006) 
36 IEA (2006) 
37 Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2006) 
38 IEA (2002) 
39 Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2006) 
40 BP Statistical review (2006) 
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6.3.2. Imports by pipeline 
Pipeline is the main way used to supply Europe with natural gas, providing a constant flow of gas 
from the three main producers, Russia, Algeria and Norway. 75% or 127.8 bcm of natural gas 
imports to Western Europe from none-European countries come through pipeline.41  
 
Russia is the major pipeline supplier with 86.0 bcm of supplies to Europe, all of which goes through 
pipeline.42 In addition, Norway supplies the continent and the UK with 76.5 bcm. The Norwegian 
production has been rapidly increasing from the mid-90s with the contribution from the Troll and 
the Ormen Lange field.  
 
Algeria has been a major supplier of gas to Europe from the 1960s and is an important pipeline 
supplier for Southern Europe, providing 37.3 bcm of gas to Italy and Spain by pipelines through 
Tunisia and Morocco respectively. The Enrico Mattei pipeline to Italy has a capacity of 27 bcm per 
year, while the Pedro Duran Farell pipeline to Cordoba in Spain can transport 13 bcm per year. 
Algeria has vast reserves of approximately 4580 bcm and its production has been rising during the 
last years to 87.8 bcm in 2005.43 Libya supplies Italy with 4.5 bcm per year through an offshore 
pipeline.  
                                                 
41 Appendix 11.3 
42 Appendix 11.3 
43 BP statistical review (2006) 
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6.3.3. Imports of LNG 
Western Europe receives 25% of their imports from non-European countries by LNG. Algeria is 
currently the most important LNG-exporter for Europe with deliveries to France (7.5 bcm), Spain 
(5.2 bcm), Belgium (2.9 bcm), Italy (2.5 bcm) and the UK (0.5 bcm). Total Algerian LNG supplies 
for Western Europe reached 18.5 bcm in 2005.44  
 
Europe has consumed LNG from Nigeria since 1999 and total import has now reached 10.8 bcm 
with Spain and France being the main importers. Egypt and Qatar have also increased their LNG 
export to Europe lately and they both supply between four and five bcm, mostly to Spain. 
Moreover, Europe receives some minor LNG volumes from other sources such as Oman, Libya and 
Trinidad and Tobago.   
 
Spain is the most significant European LNG importer with total imports of 21.9 bcm in 2005. LNG 
now makes up 2/3 of total Spanish gas imports. France is the second most important importer with 
LNG imports of 10.5 bcm in 2005. Italy imports 2.5 bcm from Algeria and the UK is currently 
resuming LNG imports with three reception terminals.  
 
                                                 
44 Appendix 11.3 
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6.4. Security of supply 
Security of energy supply is currently an important issue in Europe, with indigenous gas production 
decreasing each year. Analyzing the current situation and how LNG may play a role in improving 
security of supply is important in order to reach a conclusion on future demand for LNG in Europe. 
 
There are both short term security of supply issues such as extreme weather, technical failures and 
accidents, as well as long term security of supply issues like conflicts and lack of investment.  
 
Securing a stable supply of energy has always been one of the top priorities for every country. 
Furthermore, the majority of the world’s energy reserves are located in regions with less political 
stability than most of the net importing regions. In Europe, this issue is becoming increasingly 
important as the indigenous production (except Norway45) is declining. Western and Central Europe 
(including Norway) is currently importing 35% of its natural gas consumption, a figure which is 
anticipated to increase to 70% by 2020 and 80% - 90% in 2030.46  
 
Most of Europe’s gas imports today arrive through pipelines, mainly from the three large exporters; 
Russia, Norway and Algeria. For decades, the import dependency on the Soviet Union and Russia 
has been the most important issue regarding the security of stable gas supplies. During the cold war, 
OECD advised European countries not to become too dependent on the Soviet Union, and 
preferably to have less than a certain percentage of their imports coming from the Soviet Union. 
Still, the gas supplies were stable throughout the cold war, and through the rather chaotic transition 
period, giving the Soviet Union/Russia a reputation of a trustworthy supplier.  
 
This reputation was severely hurt on the 1st of January 2006. Ukraine has for years relied on cheap 
gas from Russia, but lately, the state-owned Russian gas company, Gazprom, has tried to increase 
the price. The dispute took a very serious turn when Gazprom shut down all gas supplies to Ukraine 
for one and a half days in a tactical move to put pressure on the Ukrainian pro-EU government. This 
obviously had severe consequences for Ukraine, but also for Western Europe. Russia supplies 35% 
                                                 
45 In this chapter I will treat Norway as part of Europe as it is the most relevant in a discussion of security of supply. 
46 UNECE (2003) 
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of Western Europe’s gas consumption, and 80% of this transits Ukraine.47 Therefore, the supplies to 
Western Europe were restrained as well.  
 
The incident with Ukraine has been followed by other similar examples of Russia using its power as 
a major energy supplier in order to increase gas prices or punish countries which disagree with 
Russia. Georgia and Belarus have been in this situation during 2006, and in May 2007 Russia cut 
off energy supplies to Estonia, which is an EU member, apparently because of political 
disagreements over a Soviet war memorial from the Second World War.48 
 
Furthermore, there are serious concerns regarding underinvestment in Russian gas industry, as 
Gazprom seems more focused on buying Turkmen gas instead of maintaining the production rate at 
their own fields. 
 
Norway has for years supplied the European continent with natural gas through offshore pipelines 
from its North Sea oil and gas fields. Being a politically highly stable country and member of 
NATO and EEA, Norway has been a safe supplier. However, its reserves in the North Sea are 
declining and are small compared to those of Russia and The Middle East. The reserves in the 
Barents Sea and new LNG projects there may ensure that Norway remains a stable supplier to 
Europe. 
 
Algeria is today a relatively calm country compared to in the 90s. The conflict between the 
government and Islamic opposition took a violent turn in 1992, and six years later approximately 
100,000 people had died. After the opposition was defeated the country has been relatively stable, 
but there are substantial social problems in the country and armed opposition still exists. Despite 
political unrest, Algeria has been a highly stable supplier of natural gas to Europe. There are import 
restrictions in place in Spain, where transporters can not import more than 60% of the gas from the 
same country. This means that Spanish companies will have to look for other sources than Algerian 
gas, as this currently makes up almost half of Spanish gas imports.49  
 
Even though there are political risks associated with importing gas from Russia and Algeria, the 
income from these trades are of paramount importance to the two countries and they have little 
                                                 
47 IEA (1998) 
48 Officialy, the supplies of gas, oil and coal were cut off because of a sudden lack of trains for transportation. 
49 Appendix 11.3 and 11.4 
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incentive to cut supplies for political reasons as long as they are relatively poor countries. There are 
probably more concerns to be raised over the transit countries which do not take part in the profit in 
the same way as the producers.  
 
One of the serious disadvantages of pipeline transport is that pipelines from Russia and the Middle 
East have to cross several borders in order to reach Europe. Political turmoil, sabotage or armed 
conflict in the transiting countries can hinder the gas flow. This was highlighted by the 
Russian/Ukrainian gas price dispute and the subsequent supply interruption. 
 
LNG has several advantages over pipeline transport regarding security of supply. Firstly, a cargo of 
LNG will usually not have to pass several borders, as it can travel in international waters to the 
destination. Secondly, the vessels and the reception terminal can receive LNG from alternative 
producers in the case of a halt in production, while a pipeline can not be moved to another country. 
This presumes that there is readily available liquefaction capacity elsewhere, which might not be 
the case. 
 
At the same time, there are several threats to the safe supply of LNG. The LNG carriers often have 
to pass straits that are strategically important on their way to Europe. From The Middle East they 
will need to sail through the Suez Canal and from the Black Sea ships have to sail through the 
Bosporus strait. The closing of, or congestion in, any of these may seriously hinder supplies. 
 
Diversification is seen as one of the most important ways to enhance security of gas supply to 
Europe. As long as pipelines from the Middle East are difficult to construct because of geopolitical 
issues, LNG may be the main vehicle to increase diversification. 
 
In conclusion, security of natural gas supply is a major issue for Europe and the flexibility and 
diversification offered by LNG will make LNG attractive from a security of supply point of view. 
This will enhance the predicted growth of LNG in Europe. 
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7. The future of natural gas and LNG in Europe 
This chapter will analyze the potential for increased use of natural gas and LNG. I will consider the 
demand and supply side separately. This means that if I predict an expansive shift in the demand 
curve, consumption is predicted to increase, and vice versa. When I for example include 
consumption forecasts from the IEA in the demand section, it is important to note that these 
estimates assume a certain shift in the supply curve / production increase as well. 
 
Firstly, I will discuss future gas demand. I will do this by using two scenarios and some general 
considerations regarding future demand. Next, I will consider the future of LNG as opposed to 
pipelines by analyzing the competitiveness of LNG compared to pipeline as a means of 
transportation. Plans for new reception terminals will be analyzed in order to see whether importers 
are committed to importing LNG.  
 
In order to analyze the supply side, I will start by using a formal model to gain insights into new 
investments in LNG capacity. Then an overview of potential new suppliers of LNG is presented. 
Finally, the competitiveness of Europe in attracting new LNG supplies compared to the other 
regional markets will be analyzed. 
 
7.1. Demand 
The conclusion from section 6.2 was that natural gas is currently in strong demand in Europe 
because of its flexibility and relatively small adverse environmental effects. In this section I will 
discuss the future demand for natural gas in Europe. If the growth in gas consumption is expected to 
continue, will the gas be transported by pipeline or as LNG? And are importers proving their 
commitment by constructing reception terminals? 
 
 38
7.1.1. Demand scenarios 
In the prediction of the gas market, as in other energy markets, it is useful to work with scenarios. 
This is due to the fact that it is often very difficult to predict one development or one scenario that is 
much more probable than other scenarios or possibilities. 
 
I will use scenario analysis to analyze the future role of LNG in Europe in two different scenarios. 
The scenarios differ in how the gas price develops the coming years, and how this affects 
consumption. The purpose is to show how the future of LNG in Europe can be significantly 
different in the two scenarios. 
 
7.1.2. Scenario 1: Strong growth in gas demand 
There is a strong case for increasing gas demand in Europe over the coming years. As discussed in 
6.2.1, natural gas has several important advantages in electricity generation. These include high 
flexibility in production with the possibility of covering increasing peak load demand, low CO2 
emissions compared to the current coal power technology and higher effectiveness and potential 
than renewable energy sources.  
 
The IEA predicts the very strong growth in demand for natural gas to continue. IEA predicts gas 
demand in OECD Europe to be at 2.1% p.a. over the coming years, reaching a consumption of 901 
bcm in 2030, twice as much as in 2000. The major part of this growth is assumed to be in power 
generation. This is especially the case in countries like Italy and Spain, while countries like Great 
Britain already use much gas in power generation. 
 
There are some important assumptions to be mentioned for this scenario to hold. The increased 
demand for gas must be met with increased supply in order to not inflate the gas price too heavily. 
This increased supply will be imported from outside Europe as EU and Norwegian reserves are 
limited and declining. This will require massive investment in production and transportation 
capacity. It is assumed that a certain part of the increased supplies will come through pipelines from 
the Middle East, Northern Africa and possibly from Central Asia / Russia. Due to limited reserves 
in the most convenient areas, difficulty of constructing pipelines through politically unstable 
countries and declining costs in the LNG-chain, it is highly likely that a significant part of the 
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increased supply will come as LNG. Pipelines from the Middle East countries like Iran are possible, 
and could supply Europe with large quantities of gas, but there are in the foreseeable future severe 
security of supply issues related to relying on stable supplies from the Iranian and other regimes in 
the region. 
 
I will therefore conclude that in this scenario, demand for LNG will increase strongly, given the 
same low level of intra-regional gas competition as of today. I believe that LNG supplies will 
increase strongly both in absolute number and relative to pipeline imports.  
 
There is one potentially strong impediment to such increase in supplies, namely strong demand 
from the other gas consuming regions of the world. As North American gas reserves are low and 
rapidly declining,50 there are reasons to believe that the coming shortfall of indigenous production 
will have to be made up by a massive increase in imports. The financial strength of this region may 
make it hard to compete with. I will come back to this in section 7.2.3 and 7.2.4. 
 
Furthermore, the economic growth in China and subsequent growth in demand for energy in general 
and gas in particular may redirect important gas flows from Russia and Central Asia to China. 
However, this might lead to increased demand for LNG in Europe, as less gas can be imported from 
Russia and Central Asia. 
 
 
                                                 
50 The R/P-ratio for USA is 10.4  
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7.1.3. Scenario 2: High gas prices limit demand 
The latter years have seen gas prices surging. Steady growth in demand, combined with inability to 
expand total production capacity in the same pace, has doubled prices over the last five years. (BP 
statistical review) The gas price is strongly linked to the oil price,51 which has increased fiercely 
due to world economic growth, increasing exploration and exploitation costs and political 
instability. 
 
In this scenario, these trends are assumed to continue. The unprecedented growth in China will 
continue, North American energy reserves will diminish and indigenous gas production in Europe 
will continue to decline. The consequent pressure for oil and gas globally will drive prices upwards. 
The political and economic power of the US will ensure that the US captures most of the LNG from 
Trinidad, Venezuela, Russia and Norway. The result will be less gas flowing to Europe, driving the 
prices upwards.  
 
A significantly higher gas price will lead to the substitution of gas in power generation by nuclear 
and new less polluting coal plants.52 Gas demand in the chemical industry will not easily be 
substituted, but household consumption can be substituted by electricity generated by nuclear and 
coal fired power plants. As we saw in 6.2.1 power generation is assumed to be the largest growth 
area for gas in the future. If high prices limit gas-for-power consumption, the total consumption 
growth for gas in Europe will be limited. 
 
In Britain, higher gas prices have already led to a shift from gas to other energy sources in new 
generation capacity. However, Britain generates a substantial part of their base load using gas, so 
new gas fired power plants will not be able to reap the benefits of the flexibility in gas fired plants 
in the same way as in energy systems with little flexible capacity.  
  
If demand does not fulfil the expectations of IEA and other analysts, LNG will probably lose out as 
it is a rather high-cost alternative as of today. LNG is more likely to become a niche supplier, and a 
stagnation of gas demand will limit demand for LNG.  
 
Hence, I conclude that in a scenario with increasing prices which in turn leads to substitution of gas 
in power generation, demand for LNG will stagnate and achieve a minor role in the European gas 
markets. 
                                                 
51 It is common in gas contracts to link the price in the contract to the oil price 
52 New technology which reduces particle and NOx emissions is being developed and tested. Carbon capture technology 
is also being developed for coal fired plants.   
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7.1.4. General demand forecasts 
Natural gas is expected to be the fastest growing energy source in Europe the coming decades. IEA 
forecasts the increase in OECD Europe gas demand to be 2.1% pa from 2000 to 2030. This means a 
growth from 482 bcm in 2000 to 901 bcm in 2030.53 
 
Direct household consumption is expected to increase by 1% pa until 2030 according to IEA. The 
same figure for industrial use is 0.8%. 
 
Strong growth in gas consumption for power generation is expected the coming years and decades. 
EIA believes that almost 60% of the increased gas demand until 2030 will be for power generation, 
while IEA predicts 72%. Increased use of gas in power generation will be the main driver for a 
strong growth in demand for natural gas in Europe. Moreover, EIA expects that gas will account for 
24% of the energy used for electricity generation by 2015 and increase further to 32% by 2030.54 
According to these projections, natural gas will become the preferred choice of fuel for new power 
generation capacity in Europe the next decades. It is important to note that higher than expected 
CO2 prices may make nuclear power generation more profitable and thus limiting the growth in gas 
consumption.   
 
There are differences within Europe regarding predictions for future gas consumption. In Britain, 
gas use is not expected to increase because of price increases and the already widespread use. Some 
countries like Spain and Italy are expected to increase the use of gas-fired power plants heavily in 
the coming years. 
 
As heavy industry moves out of Western Europe, household consumption will make up a larger part 
of electricity consumption. Household consumption varies substantially more during the day and 
with the temperature thus demanding electricity generation that is easily regulated. Therefore, the 
need for peak-load capacity compared to base-load capacity will be greater over the coming years, 
and this will especially favour natural gas over nuclear and coal. Natural gas is expected to be more 
financially attractive than renewable energy sources in the near future.55 
 
These arguments make a strong case for natural gas in Europe the coming years.  
                                                 
53 IEA (2002) 
54 IEA (2006) 
55 There is little hydropower potential left to be exploited in Europe and technologies for sun, tidal, osmosis and 
offshore wind power are still poor and expensive. 
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7.1.5. Use of LNG vs. pipeline transport 
 
Transportation costs
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Cost reductions in LNG transportation would reduce the slope of the curve showing the relationship 
between cost per BTU and distance, as shown in the figure above. There are some economies of 
scale from using larger vessels. The tendency is increasing size of the vessels, so one should expect 
unit costs to come down.  
 
Cost reductions in liquefaction and regasification will lower the starting point of the curve showing 
the relationship between cost per BTU and distance. There are economies of scale from having two 
trains instead of one and from making larger trains.56 Increasingly larger trains are being 
constructed and unit costs decrease. 
 
                                                 
56 Approximately 20%, section 5.3.1 
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As long as pipeline costs are fairly stable, the technological progress in LNG lowers LNG unit costs 
relative to pipeline unit costs, with the effect of making LNG economically feasible for more gas 
projects. This will make LNG able to compete with piped gas in projects with large volumes. 
A decisive aspect is where the new gas supplies to Europe will come from. Potential new supplies 
from Central Asia will probably be transported by pipeline while new supplies from Nigeria and/or 
Qatar will come as LNG.  
 
There are plans for pipelines from Russia, Algeria, Egypt, Libya, The Middle East and The Caspian 
Basin. Algeria has particularly concrete plans for offshore pipelines to Italy and Spain. There are 
plans for LNG supplies from North Africa, The Middle East, South America and Norway. 
 
LNG adds more flexibility for producers. Increasingly higher flexibility and shorter duration of 
LNG contracts make it possible for the producer to redirect shipments to areas with higher prices. 
Historically, there have been significant price differences between regions and the LNG exporter 
would be able to exploit these by redirecting the shipments while a pipeline exporter would not 
have this option. This possibility should be treated as a real option in the supplier's decision 
analysis. Some part of such price differentials is due to a large portion of LNG consumption instead 
of piped gas consumption. This is the case in Japan and to a certain degree in the UK. 
 
The conclusion is that the increased European demand will be covered by a combination of LNG 
and piped gas. Cost reductions in LNG will make it more attractive, but the extent of its future use 
depends on many factors treated in this paper which I will come back to in the final conclusions. 
 
7.1.6. Planned reception terminals 
In order to determine future LNG consumption in Europe it is important to consider the number of 
reception terminals under construction. Because of the significant investment needed this is a strong 
signal of commitment. Currently, several new reception terminals are being constructed and 
planned in Western Europe. Moreover, there are many expansion projects underway.    
 
UK is expanding its reception capacity even further with an expansion project in South Hook LNG, 
Milford Haven, which will double capacity from 10.5 bcm/year to 21 bcm/year in 2010. The 
Dragon LNG project in Milford Haven will be completed in 2007, receiving 6 bcm/year. There are 
plans for expanding the Isle of Grain terminal and constructing a new terminal in Anglesey, Wales. 
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In Italy, around ten new terminals are under planning. According to Soetaert, there may come two 
or three more LNG-terminals in Italy, but not as many as suggested by some. The La Spezia 
terminal is expanding capacity, and Edison LNG Riviso is under construction. 
 
In Spain, there are talks of expanding the terminal in Barcelona. A new terminal in Reganosa is 
under construction, and there are expansion projects underway in Sagunto (Valencia), Bilbao, 
Cartagena and Huelva. 
 
The Sines terminal in Portugal is due to complete an expansion from 5.2 bcm/year to 8.5 bcm/year 
during 2007. In Belgium, the terminal in Zeebrugge is doubling its capacity from 4.5 bcm/year to 
9bcm/year of gas, in a project that will be completed in 2007. 
 
In France, the Fos Cavous is expanding and is due to be finished in 2007. A new terminal is being 
constructed in Verdon that will enter operations in 2010. Additionally, there are talks of reception 
terminals in the Netherlands and in Germany. 
 
To conclude, substantial investments are being made in LNG reception capacity in Europe. This is a 
strong indicator of increased future use of LNG. 
 
It is not likely to get a situation with over-capacity in LNG-reception. The reason for this is the high 
risk taken on by the last actor to invest in reception capacity. If demand drops, the last one to 
construct a reception terminal will incur heavy losses if he is not secured by long-term contracts, 
and long-term contracts are becoming more seldom. This will discipline the actors in the reception 
terminal business. 
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(King&Spalding, 2006) 
 
The map shows existing terminals, terminals under construction and proposed terminals. Relatively 
few of the proposed terminals are expected to be realised, but many of the existing ones are 
expected to be expanded. Currently, there are between 38.8 and 44.8 bcm of reception capacity 
under construction and between 34 and 49 bcm are under planning.57 The French commission for 
deregulation of energy markets, CRE, predicts European import capacity to increase from 50 bcm in 
2004 to 145 in 2010. 
                                                 
57 CRE 
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7.2. Supply 
In order to predict the future of LNG in Europe I will now consider the supply side. Firstly, there is 
a need for more liquefaction capacity supplying the Atlantic market, either by increasing production 
from existing sources or by the entrance of new suppliers. Secondly, Europe must attract a certain 
part of that production increase.  
 
7.2.1. Theoretical approach to increasing gas supplies 
In order to gain further insight into the mechanisms regarding investments in gas supplying capacity 
I will present and apply a model from Hannesson (1998). In Hannesson (1998) this model describes 
a market with third party access to a gas pipeline and two sellers. In this market there is one low-
cost and one high-cost producer, and the model analyzes their decision to invest or not to invest in 
new production capacity.  
 
I will use this model in order to analyze a situation with one buyer of gas (e.g. the national gas 
company), and two kinds of suppliers. One of the kinds of suppliers has low production costs, while 
the other has high costs. Due to security of supply issues there is a desire not to import more than a 
certain percentage of total imports from the low-cost suppliers, even if this was possible. The low-
cost / high-risk suppliers will consist of Russian piped gas, Algerian gas and potential supplies by 
e.g. Iran. High-cost / low-risk suppliers would be EU indigenous supply, Norway (both pipe and 
LNG) and LNG from Australia, Trinidad and Brunei. I assume that the two groups act like two 
players, which means that the suppliers in each group behave similar to the other members of their 
group because they coordinate their actions. After that I will use the framework to analyze the effect 
of having more buyers and liberalizing the obligation to import a certain part of total imports from 
each supplier. 
 
Demand for natural gas is given by the linear demand function: 
 
P = a – bQ (1) 
 
Transportation costs are ignored and P is the price net of such costs. 
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Because of security of supply issues like those described in chapter 6.4 the buyer will diversify its 
supplies by importing a fixed share, α, from the low-cost producers, and thus a fixed share, 1-α, 
from the high-cost producers. 
 
This gives us 
 
Q1 = αQ and Qh = (1- α)Q, Ql + Qh = Q (2) 
 
We assume that α is both known and fixed, although this might very well not be the case in real life. 
There are good reasons not to disclose security of supply policies. Moreover, it is not likely that the 
importing region will have an entirely fixed α. The total profit of the gas purchase will be 
 
P(Q)Q – αQCl – (1 – α)QCh  (3) 
 
as the prices paid to the producers from the importer net out. Maximizing the total profit to be 
shared leads to 
 
P + P'Q = αCl + (1 – α)Ch  (4) 
 
Which gives us the profit obtained by each group of suppliers 
 
πl = Ql(Sl-Cl), πh = Qh(Sh – Ch)  (5) 
 
and the profit obtained by the importer will be 
 
πimp = Ql(P(Q) – Sl) + Qh(P(Q) – Sh)  (6) 
 
If assuming that the importer and the producers will share the profit equally 
 
Sl = Cl + ½(P – Cl), Sh = Ch + ½(P – Ch)  (7) 
 
If we use the values a = 10, b = 1, Cl = 2, Ch = 4 and α = 0,5 we get Q = 3.5, P = 6.5, Sl = 4.25 and 
Sh = 5.25. 
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The price paid to the producers varies from 4.25 to 5.25 which is a substantial price difference. This 
price difference exists because of the obligation to diversify the imports. As long as this obligation 
is in place one may observe that importing countries like Spain may be willing to pay more for 
LNG from Norway than LNG or piped gas from Algeria. As will be mentioned later in this paper, 
Spanish companies have an obligation not to import more than 60% of their gas supplies from one 
single country. A price difference like the one shown in the analysis above will give different 
investment incentives in different regions. Producers which are considered safe suppliers may 
invest in projects with higher costs than producers which are not considered safe suppliers because 
the safe suppliers can charge a higher price for the gas. 
 
What if the market is liberalized, more actors are allowed to import gas and the obligation to buy 
half of the total quantum from each supplier is relaxed? This is partly what has happened in Europe 
lately, with a liberalization and deregulation of the gas market, the entrance of new importers like 
power companies importing LNG, and the relaxation of import restrictions on Russian gas as the 
cold war has ended. 
 
In order to analyze this we will have to classify the competition between the two groups of 
suppliers. The conventional classification separates between whether price or quantity is the 
decision variable. With price as decision variable, Bertrand competition, the low-cost producers will 
lower their price to a level marginally below the marginal cost of the high-cost producers, thus 
capturing the entire market. The only way for the high-cost suppliers to be present in the market 
would be for reasons of diversification. Otherwise there would be no place for the high-cost 
suppliers until the low-cost suppliers have exhausted their resources. This kind of competition 
assumes that the low-cost suppliers have capacity to supply the needed quantity at a fixed marginal 
cost, an assumption that is highly unlikely. 
 
The other possibility is competition with quantity as decision variable. This is more likely due to the 
high capital costs involved in building new production capacity. With quantity as decision variable 
each group of suppliers would decide on how much gas to supply, taking into account the amount 
supplied by the other group of suppliers. There will be no price difference between the two groups 
of suppliers as there is no security of supply constraint. One can separate between the situation 
where both make their decision simultaneously, Cournot competition, and where one of the players 
has the advantage of being the first to make the decision, Stackelberg competition. I will here 
analyze the situation using Cournot competition. 
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The revenue (R) of supplier i will be given by multiplying the price by the quantity sold by the 
same supplier (Qi): 
 
Ri = aQi – bQQi, i = l,h, Q = Ql + Qh (8) 
 
The marginal revenue, given the quantity supplied by the other supplier, will be 
 
a – bQj – 2bQi, i,j = l,h; j ≠ i  (9) 
 
For each player, the optimum solution will be where his marginal cost equals his marginal revenue. 
In order for the solution to be consistent, the quantity supplied by each must end up being the same 
as the other supplier assumed. Setting the marginal revenues equal to the marginal cost and solving 
the equations gives us 
 
Qi = (a + Cj – 2Ci)/3b, i,j, = l,h; j ≠ i  (10) 
 
This solution returns values of P = 5.33 and Q = 4.67 which consists of Ql = 3.33 and Qh = 1.33. πl 
will be marginally less than 12 under Bertrand competition and 11.09 under Cournot competition. 
 
As shown, the high-cost suppliers will lower their quantum, while the low-cost suppliers will 
increase their quantum compared to the situation where buyers were obliged to buy half of their 
supplies from each supplier. The net effect will be an increase in supplies as the low-cost suppliers 
will increase supplies by more than what the high-cost suppliers lower supplies by. In practice, 
high-cost suppliers may lower their supplies even more because of declining reserves and higher 
costs for the gas that is left. I will now include this aspect of different and finite reserves. 
 
The models above treat the supply of gas as being infinite, but this is untrue as gas is a finite and 
exhaustible resource. The following model takes the time aspect into account. 
 
The high-cost suppliers have 50 units of reserves, while the low-cost suppliers have 100 units. This 
fits well with the reserves overview in chapter 4, although the difference is larger than 50 to 100.  
Their initial production capacity is 1.75 each. We saw that under Cournot competition the low-cost 
suppliers would like to supply 3.33 units. To do this, the low-cost suppliers must expand capacity 
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by 1.58. There is a certain lead time for this expansion project. The present value of the profit for 
supplier i can be expressed as 
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The future is here divided in three phases. The first phase is the time it takes to build the new 
capacity, thus the quantum will be at the current level. The second phase is where the new capacity 
has come on stream and both the low-cost and the high-cost suppliers are producing. In the last 
phase, the suppliers with the least resources have run out of reserves and there is only one group of 
suppliers still producing. K is the present value of the investment in new capacity and r is the 
discount rate. Operating costs are ignored. 
 
We now assume that both the low-cost and the high-cost suppliers have the possibility of doubling 
their capacity at a cost K. The lead time will be five years (T = 5) and because expanding 
production capacity is visible, it is assumed that both kinds of suppliers will be able to increase their 
capacity simultaneously.  
 
If both invest in new capacity the price will decline to 3, while if only one of them expands, the 
price will be 4.75. If the low-cost producers with large reserves choose to expand, their price will be 
6.5 in the last period compared with 8.25 if they keep their capacity unchanged. 
 
The figures 2 and 4 which are inserted into (7) can be interpreted as the cost per unit per year for the 
low-cost and high-cost producers respectively. This is thus the break-even price. For r = 0.1 the 
present value at time zero for an annual production of 1.75 until the reserves are emptied is 66 for 
the high-cost producers at a price of 4, and 35 for the low-cost producers at a price of 2. If 
production is starting at time zero and the cost of doubling the capacity is the same as the cost of 
initial capacity, 66 and 35 would be the values for K for the two kinds of producers. In the payoff 
matrix below are the results for the two producers in the four different situations. 
 
 
 
 
Payoff to high-cost producers ; payoff to low-cost producers 
High-cost / Low cost No investment Investment 
No investment 107.2 ; 115.0 90.4 ; 103.9 
Investment 48.6 ; 106.1 22.8 ; 86.1 
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The dominant strategy for either supplier would be not to invest, regardless of what the other does. 
The result of liberalisation and relaxation of the obligation to diversify will in this case be that the 
suppliers do not want to increase capacity. However, this result depends totally on the cost of new 
capacity. If the cost is 20 and 10 respectively, the result would be as shown in the matrix below. 
  
 
 
 
 
Payoff to high-cost producers ; payoff to low-cost producers 
 
In this case the low-cost suppliers will choose to invest, while the high-cost suppliers will refrain. 
The capacity will increase to 4.25 and the price will fall from 6.5 to 4.75 in phase two. 
 
This shows that the cost level of new capacity is important, and can be critical to new investments. 
This is a relevant and important conclusion as the costs of the LNG chain have declined over the 
last years, and are expected to continue declining. This may make new LNG projects like supplies 
from the Middle East more likely.  
 
Furthermore, the analysis above shows that the high-cost suppliers lose when relaxing the security 
of supply-alpha. This is natural, as there would be less incentive to pay more for low-risk supplies if 
one is not obliged to do so. With ever-changing international relations, security of supply may soon 
increase in importance and low-risk suppliers might be able to charge a higher price if the market 
and the European governments attaches a risk-premium to gas from certain sources. 
 
High-cost / Low cost No investment Investment 
No investment 107.2 ; 115.0 90.4 ; 128.9 
Investment 94.6 ; 106.1 68.8 ; 111.1 
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7.2.2. New LNG production capacity 
The literature seems united in predicting that the Middle East will become the fastest growing LNG 
exporter in the years to come. The region has vast gas reserves and some of the countries are eager 
to monetize their gas resources. The most important feature of LNG from the Middle East is that it 
can economically supply all three regional markets, East Asia, Europe and North America. With 
contracts being of increasingly shorter duration, this may mean that the Middle East producers act 
opportunistically, selling to the region with the highest prices. 
 
The countries in the Middle East will probably start increasing exploitation of their enormous gas 
reserves soon, and they will probably export a significant share of their production to Europe, as 
well as a certain share to Asia. Oman and Qatar will increase their production. Saudi gas reserves 
are located inland and their exploitation will be more complex than in many other countries. Qatar 
has been a driving force of LNG development in the Middle East, and according to Jensen (2004) 
Qatar will continue to aggressively pursue new opportunities. 
 
However, there are impediments for increased European imports from the Middle East, above all 
the political situation. Even though higher imports of gas from the Middle East will reduce 
Russia’s, Norway’s and Algeria’s market share, and consequently their market power, it carries its 
own risk. This is particularly important regarding potential Iranian supplies because of the current 
dispute over its nuclear program.  
 
Suppliers from other regions are also in the process of increasing supplies of LNG. Algeria and 
Nigeria are increasing production. Furthermore, several new suppliers to the Atlantic LNG market 
are expected to start production shortly. These include Equatorial Guinea (2008), Angola (2010), 
Norway (2007), Venezuela (2011), Iran (2011), Russia (2012-2015) and Yemen (2008).58  
 
In the Barents Sea, the Snøhvit field is under development and is expected to come on stream in 
2007.59 It will produce LNG for both the American and the European market. In Europe it is 
expected to supply Spain with 1.6 bcm annually and France with 1.7 bcm annually through its 
French partners Gaz de France and Total.  
 
                                                 
58 Hallouche (2006) 
59 Statoil.com 
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This map shows the intraregional 
trade flows of natural gas in bcm, as predicted by IEA in the World Energy Outlook 2004. It is 
worth noticing the large amounts of natural gas that is anticipated to be transported by LNG in 
2030. One should also note how Middle East producers supply Asia, Europe and North America, 
and that the supplies are expected to experience an extreme growth. According to these projections, 
the Middle East is expected to be a very significant supplier to Europe. Africa is expected to triple 
exports for Europe and supply almost the same amount as Russia.  
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7.2.3. Competition from North America – long-term 
It is highly probable that US demand for gas imports will be higher in the next decade. The reason 
for this is the low R/P-ratio of approximately ten years (4.2) and rising demand for gas. As demand 
is increasing, the only way to maintain sufficient supplies is by increasing imports, as long as new 
large discoveries are not made. Canada will not be able to supply North America with sufficient 
amounts of gas by pipeline, so LNG import is the most probable solution to the future gas deficit of 
North America. 
 
Declining shipping costs due to technological progress and economies of scale may make it 
economically feasible to transport LNG from the Middle East, North-Western Russia and West 
Africa to the American East coast. The question for Europe is whether North America, and 
particularly the US, will be able to attract a large part of LNG-production and thereby reduce LNG-
supplies to Europe. 
  
Because most of the current and potential LNG-supplies to the Atlantic basin are located closer to 
Europe than to the US, the price in the US will need to be higher than the price in Europe to 
compensate for higher transportation costs.  
 
New projects will be more likely to destine the LNG for the American market than for the European 
market only if the price is assumed to be sufficiently much higher in the US than in Europe to make 
up for the higher cost of transporting the LNG to the US instead of Europe. 
 
I will present an analysis and estimate by James Jensen (2006) of Oxford Institute for Energy 
Studies. He uses an expansion of an existing LNG-plant as point of departure, and estimates total 
costs for different producers supplying the US Gulf and Spain.  
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(Jensen 2006) 
 
The figure above shows the costs of supplying a US Gulf terminal. Estimates include costs from 
liquefaction, transport by standard 138,000cm tankers and regasification for expansion with 
3.3MMT trains. Qatar [2] assumes 7.5MMT trains and 200,000cm tankers, and shows the 
economies of scale in the LNG value chain. Marginal costs of Australian LNG are included to show 
the competitiveness of surplus LNG even from distant sources. This will be examined in detail in 
the next section. 
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(Jensen 2006) 
 
The figure above shows the costs of supplying a Spanish terminal, with the same assumptions as in 
the figure on the last page. 
 
A comparison of the costs to the US and to Spain reveals a cost differential of approximately $0.8 
for supplies from the Middle East and $0.5 from West Africa.  
 
The conclusion from the analysis is that it shows a significant, but not inhibiting cost differential 
between supplying the US and Spain. The cost differential between the US and Northern Europe 
(e.g. UK and Belgium) will be less. Still, Europe has a cost advantage over the US in attracting new 
LNG supplies. 
 
The financial and political power of the US may however lead to a situation where the US will 
obtain a large share of LNG from the Middle East, Russia and West Africa, reducing Europe’s 
share. It seems clear from most of the articles I have studied, and from the interviews with analysts, 
that North America will drive LNG development and be able to attract a significant portion of new 
LNG supplies, even though it is situated further away from most of the potential new LNG-sources 
than Europe is. However, the analysis above indicate that Europe has a substantial cost advantage 
over North America and should be able to attract a significant portion of new LNG production. 
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Long-term LNG-contracts are more than pure business contracts with profitability maximization as 
the goal. They are often the result of bilateral agreements between countries and issues like 
international relations, politics and security of supply will influence the decision of who to supply. 
 
There are strong signals that North America and particularly the US will take a leading role in the 
Atlantic LNG market. As of July 2006 there were 5 reception terminals in North America and 45 
proposed ones. Half of these had received federal regulatory approval and 7 were in the last 
planning stage or under construction. The total capacity of these seven projects and the existing 
ones would be 140 bcm/year, compared to US LNG imports of 18 bcm/year in 2005. 60 The latter 
number is expected to rise to 80 bcm in 2015 and 125 bcm in 2030, according to EIA.61 The North 
American importers are likely to be serious competitors for the LNG available in the Atlantic Basin. 
  
7.2.4. Competition from North America – short-term 
In the shorter term, a marginal cost / marginal income argument is more relevant. Supplies may be 
diverted if there are volumes that are free of any contractual obligations. The spot price differential 
will then be evaluated against the marginal cost of increasing the transport distance. If the price in 
the US is higher than the added costs of shipping the gas to the US instead of Europe, the gas will 
be diverted.  
 
When considering the necessary price differentials for diverting supplies on a marginal cost basis, 
the results get very different from the results in the analyses in the last section. Obviously, a smaller 
price premium is needed in the US to make it profitable to ship the gas to the US than to Europe on 
a marginal cost basis than on a full cost recovery basis. The supplier will need a price premium that 
is high enough to cover the increased costs of making the longer voyage to the US instead of to 
Europe.  
 
Jensen has calculated that it is necessary with a $0.53 higher price in the US Gulf than in Spain to 
provide the same result for an exporter in The Middle East.62 The equivalent for the US instead of 
Belgium would be $0.21. 
                                                 
60 Stern (2006) 
61 EIA (2006) 
62 The calculation assumes the shipping to the US is done by a 200,000cm tanker, while all other shipments are done by 
standard tankers. If using a standard vessel on the leg to the US, the necessary price difference would have to be 
$0.14/MMBtu 
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There is a tendency for higher prices in the US than in Europe, but the size of this difference varies. 
Moreover, the prices paid for LNG are often kept secret and are difficult to find. The future LNG 
prices are hard to predict, and it is therefore difficult to conclude on whether the US or Europe will 
win the battle over the volumes in the short term LNG-market. Still, it is worth noticing that the 
price differential needed for the US to attract supplies is relatively small compared to the 
differences between the American and European gas prices the last five years.   
 
 
(Jensen 2006) 
 
This figure shows tanker transportation costs from Trinidad, Nigeria and Algeria to Belgium, Spain 
and USA (East Coast and Gulf), assuming 138,000cm tankers. Trinidad is the only current producer 
that is situated closer to the US than to Europe, and consequently the only producer that will rather 
sell free volumes of LNG to the US than to Europe if the prices are equal. 
 
The conclusion is that higher prices in the US than in Europe will divert a portion of the, by now, 
relatively small amounts of short term traded LNG to the US instead of to Europe. This will be the 
case as long as the price differential is larger than the cost differential from transporting the LNG to 
the US instead of to Europe. When comparing the price differential needed according to Jensen 
(2006) to the price differentials between the American and European gas markets found in section 
4.5, I will conclude that the increased demand in the US relatively easily will produce a price 
differential of the required size. 
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7.2.5. Competition from other regions 
Other regions may compete for new LNG-supplies from the Middle East. Japan and South Korea 
import large volumes of LNG, and increased demand may make them look to the Middle East for 
new resources. Indonesia, which is a major supplier to Japan and South Korea, is currently 
experiencing problems with even delivering the contracted volumes. Large contract volumes expire 
around 2010/2011 and Indonesia will probably not be able to renew these contracts.63 Japan and 
South Korea have few substitution options and are financially strong. They might become 
competitors for LNG from the Middle East as the sailing distance from Qatar to Japan is 
approximately the same as the sailing distance to Belgium.   
 
China is one of the most recent entrants in the LNG business. It had very ambitious plans in the 
early 2000s of constructing a large number of reception terminals, but after the oil price surge and 
consequent LNG price surge in 2004, the Chinese have scrapped many of the planned projects. 
Chinese importers are not able to compete on price with Japanese and South Korean importers. 
According to Stern, China had one terminal in operation, one under construction and nine under 
planning in October 2006. Chinese gas import policy appears to have shifted from LNG towards 
pipeline gas. The abundant gas reserves of Eastern Siberia are better suited for pipeline transport 
than LNG, and they have few other potential consumers within reachable distance. China will also 
start importing gas from Turkmenistan from 2009.64 
 
Another country with the potential of becoming a large importer is India. It has two reception 
terminals, but has problems affording the LNG. There have been plans for large-scale gas imports 
from Iran. These projects seem unrealistic in the near future because of security issues. A potential 
pipeline has to transit through Pakistan, and energy projects, such as LNG imports, involving Iran 
will be incompatible with maintaining good relations with the US. However, India contracted large 
volumes of LNG from Iran in 2005 with supplies commencing in 2009, but it is unknown when or 
whether this supply will start.65 LNG imports from Qatar could be feasible, but as the market is 
now, India cannot compete on price with Europe, USA and Japan / South Korea. 
 
Jonathan Stern of the Oxford Centre for Energy Studies thinks that neither China nor India will 
become a serious competitor to Europe for natural gas. This contradicts the EIA who believes that 
                                                 
63 Stern (2006) 
64 Stern (2006) 
65 The Hindu Business Line 
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China may import 70 bcm/year of LNG by 2015. However, from the recent development described 
above it seems clear that in the foreseeable future Japan and South Korea will be fiercer competitors 
to Europe than China and India will. 
 
7.2.6. Predictions for indigenous supply  
As of today, Britain is not anymore a net exporter and Clingendael International Energy assumes a 
substantial supply gap in 2010. The decline in British gas production and the subsequent supply gap 
will probably have to be alleviated by LNG from the Middle East and Russia. 
 
Germany, Italy and Denmark also produce certain amounts of natural gas with 19.9, 12.0 and 10.4 
bcm respectively in 2005.66 The production from these countries is likely to decline in the coming 
years. 
 
Norwegian production is expected to continue the increase until 2010. The anticipated increase is 
believed by EIA to approximately fill the supply gap caused by the decline in British production. 
According to the Norwegian Petroleum Directorate Norway exported 82.5 bcm in 2005, a figure 
which they expect to increase to 120 bcm towards 2010 and then remain stable until 2030. The new 
offshore gas pipeline “Langeled” will supply UK with 80 mcm of gas per day from the Ormen 
Lange field, which equals 29.2 bcm a year.67  
 
IEA believes that OECD Europe production is to remain stable at 300 bcm until 2020 and then 
decline modestly to 276 bcm in 2030.68  
                                                 
66 IEA (2006) 
67 Norwegian Ministry of Petroleum and Energy (2006) 
68 IEA (2006) 
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8. The impact on the market power of the gas suppliers 
 
The impact on the market power of the current suppliers from the anticipated growth in LNG 
supplies will be treated in this chapter. Firstly, the degree of market power that they possess will be 
analyzed, using oligopoly theory. On the basis of these analyses and the analyses in the earlier 
chapters, conclusions will be drawn regarding the probable impact of LNG.   
 
8.1. Characteristics of the supplies from Russia, Algeria and Norway 
Currently, Europe is mainly supplied by Russia, Norway and Algeria. These exporting countries 
have been characterized by negotiating on a country-to-country basis, rather than letting the 
companies negotiate in the market. Moreover, the large production companies are usually fully or 
partly state-owned, for example Statoil, Hydro, Sonatrach and Gazprom.  
 
In Norway, the production companies were organized in a Gas Negotiating Committee 
(Gassforhandlingsutvalget) whose objective was to maximize the price by price coordination and 
cartel formation. This committee has now been dissolved and the companies negotiate more 
independently with European buyers.  
 
In Russia, state-owned Gazprom controls most of the production and all transportation. There have 
been talks of unbundling, but this does not seem likely at the moment, and Gazprom will probably 
remain the world’s largest gas company. There are important independent producers as well, but 
these are not allowed to export, as Gazprom enjoys export monopoly. 
 
In Algeria, Sonatrach is the state-owned company which controls most of the gas industry. 
Recently, some foreign companies like BP Amoco have gained access to investing in infrastructure, 
after a significant liberalization of energy legislation in 2005. 
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8.2. Market power 
In this section I present theory on market power to be used to analyze the actual and potential 
market power of the current large suppliers and potential market power of new suppliers. I will first 
present the three sources of monopoly power to see whether it is useful to use these in order to 
determine the degree of monopoly power of the three large suppliers of natural gas to Europe. I will 
then discuss to what degree supplying natural gas to Europe is a natural monopoly. Finally, I will 
present oligopoly theory to be used to analyze the power of the current suppliers and the effects of 
potential new suppliers that will emerge as LNG becomes more widespread. 
 
8.2.1. The three sources of monopoly power 
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld there are three sources of monopoly power: the elasticity of 
market demand; the number of suppliers and the interaction among suppliers. 
 
The elasticity of market demand sets a lower limit for each supplier’s demand elasticity. Because 
elastic demand reduces the ability for the supplier to increase prices, high demand elasticity will 
reduce the supplier’s power, even if it is a sole supplier. This has implications for cartels. In markets 
with relatively inelastic demand there are large potential gains from organizing a cartel. An example 
is the oil market and OPEC’s power over oil prices in the 70’s. In markets with more elastic 
demand, like the coffee market, cartelization is less profitable. 
 
The demand elasticity in the gas market is fairly low in the short term. It is, however, not as 
inelastic as the elasticity of oil demand. In practice, there are no substitutes to oil products used for 
transportation, such as gasoline, in the short run. In household gas consumption, electricity is to a 
certain degree a substitute. In power generation, gas fired power stations constitute a relatively 
small part of total generating capacity with a total of 14 % of total generated electricity in Europe in 
2003.69 Although the gas suppliers enjoy a relatively inelastic demand, it is not as elastic as oil 
demand. 
 
                                                 
69 IEA (2006) 
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The more suppliers of a certain size, the more difficult it will be for one of them to increase prices. 
With three main suppliers of gas to Europe there should be limited potential for any of them to raise 
prices considerably. This assumes, however, that the others have spare capacity. This is probably 
not the case in the short run, but may be in the longer run if the price rises to a point where it is 
profitable to exploit new gas fields or re-open old ones. To conclude, the fact that there are only 
three major suppliers can make it possible for one of them, especially Russia, to use a limited 
degree of market power. This will change if the new LNG-suppliers manage to get substantial 
market shares. 
 
If the suppliers compete aggressively with each other they will have little monopoly power. They 
can not only refrain from aggressive competition, but also co-operate. This can happen either by an 
official agreement, like the OPEC cartel, or by tacit collusion. Of the three sources of monopoly 
power, the last one is probably the most relevant and important in the market for gas supplies to 
Europe. In 8.3 I will discuss whether Algeria, Russia and Norway exploit this source of monopoly 
power and whether other gas suppliers are trying to get monopoly power by forming a cartel. 
 
8.2.2. European gas supplies as a natural monopoly 
The definition of a natural monopoly is a situation where “one supplier can produce the entire 
output of the market at a cost lower than what it would be if there were several suppliers”.70 
 
This is usually the product of strong economies of scale. In gas supply there are strong economies 
of scale up to a certain point. In exploration and exploitation there are some economies of scale. 
There are economies of scale when constructing pipelines up to a certain diameter, and there are 
economies of scale in LNG as it is less costly per train to build two LNG trains than to build only 
one. 
 
However, the strongest reason why the market for gas to Europe has the traits of a natural oligopoly 
is because it is natural in the sense that only a few producers were blessed with having gas reserves 
that were economically possible to exploit, and transport, to Europe at an economically feasible 
cost. 
 
                                                 
70 Pindyck and Rubinfeld 
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Transporting gas to Europe from other major sources than Norway, Russia and Algeria by pipeline 
is costly and in many cases impossible because of geopolitical issues like the need for transiting 
conflict areas. Large-scale LNG transportation has been associated with too large investments and 
too high risks to be a viable alternative. These conditions have made the market for gas imports to 
Europe a natural oligopoly. 
 
LNG has the possibility of reducing or removing the last of the two reasons for a natural oligopoly.  
Because of the decreasing costs in the LNG value chain, more producers may supply Europe and 
may supply large enough volumes to reduce the current supplier’s market power. Increased use of 
LNG will reduce risks. Together with cost reductions this will reduce the major entry barrier in the 
market for supplying Europe with gas. 
 
8.2.3. Cartel theory 
In order to gain monopoly power producers may organize a cartel in which they co-operate about 
what volumes they will offer or what price they will set. If a sufficient amount of total volume is 
organized in the cartel and market demand is sufficiently inelastic, the cartel will be able to control 
the volume offered and prices. A relevant example of this is to be found in the oil market where 
OPEC was able to control parts of the total output and thus the price for several years. However, 
after the oil price shocks of 1973 and 1979 importers began to find ways of substituting oil and 
thereby reducing OPEC’s power. There are also several examples of markets where cartels have not 
been able to control the market, even though they have controlled substantial parts of total output. 
 
According to Pindyck and Rubinfeld there are two conditions for cartel success. The first is that the 
suppliers must create a stable organization that is able to agree on volumes and prices, and that is 
able to make the members adhere to these restrictions. The latter is challenging as each supplier will 
have an incentive to supply larger volumes than agreed upon in order to get a cartel price on larger 
volumes. The threat that such behaviour eventually will drive prices back towards free market 
equilibrium will be the only reason for cartel members to stick to the production quotas. For this 
condition to hold, a relatively small number of suppliers must control a significant share of total 
output and prevent new suppliers from entering the market. The second condition is the potential for 
monopoly power, which means that the market demand needs to be sufficiently inelastic. If demand 
is highly elastic, there will be little potential for higher profits from organizing. 
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One can show how a cartel can obtain high prices in a market with inelastic demand by using the oil 
market and OPEC as an example. The figure below shows how OPEC has been able to increase the 
oil price by using its market power.  
 
 
 
TD is aggregated world demand for oil, Sc is the competitive supply curve. The difference between 
these is OPEC’s demand curve, DOPEC. This is inelastic because TD and Sc are inelastic. The profit 
maximizing quantity for OPEC, QOPEC, is found at the intersection of its marginal revenue and 
marginal cost curves. The corresponding price is P*. Without the OPEC cartel, the price would have 
been Pc, derived from the intersection of OPEC’s demand and marginal cost curves. 
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8.3. Do Russia, Algeria and Norway have and exert market power? 
Western Europe (excluding Norway) imports 35% of the natural gas it consumes and as mentioned 
earlier in this paper, the import dependence is set to increase further over the coming years. With a 
joint share of 88.6% of Western European gas imports, it is easy to see the possibility of Russia, 
Algeria and Norway exerting market power in the European gas market.71 
 
From theory of monopoly power one would believe that it would be tempting for the three suppliers 
to co-operate on price and volume either by tacit collusion or by forming a cartel. As mentioned 
earlier, the three countries have formed national monopolies within each country as to gain market 
power. However, there have not been clear signs of any attempts of cartelization between these 
national monopolies, Gazprom, Sonatrach and The Norwegian Gas Negotiating Committee.72  
 
Two interesting questions will then be why these countries have not been co-operating and if it is 
probable that they will start co-operating in the future. For Norway’s part, a too visible co-operation 
with Russia and Algeria would be damaging for Norway’s good relationship with the EU and a 
violation of the EEA agreement. As ESA, the competition monitoring body of the EU, managed to 
dissolve the Norwegian Gas Negotiating Committee, it will certainly not accept a price/volume-
cooperation with Russia. Furthermore, it would not be consistent with Norway’s foreign policy as a 
NATO-member, a membership which is crucial for Norway as a small, resource-rich country 
bordering Russia. Energy supply is tightly linked to national security, and a cartel-like cooperation 
between Norway and Russia, with the intention of exploiting Norway’s NATO-allies in Europe, 
would not be in Norway’s overall best interest. I will therefore conclude that it would not be 
beneficial for Norway to join a gas cartel and practically impossible because of the tight 
relationship with the EU.  
 
The alternative is a cartel between Russia and Algeria. Currently, the two suppliers are not 
competing against each other directly in some parts of the European market. These markets can be 
split in Germany, Belgium and the Netherlands where Russia supplies substantial volumes and 
Algeria supplies nothing, and the Iberian Peninsula where Algeria supplies by both pipeline and 
LNG while Russia does not yet supply. However, in France and Italy, Algeria and Russia supply 
                                                 
71 Appendix 11.3 
72 The Gas Negotiating Committee has been dissolved, but Norsk Hydro and Statoil remain large, partly state-owned 
players 
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approximately equal parts.73 In these two countries there may therefore be potential gains in co-
operating. Moreover, there may be potential gains from co-operation in the other parts of Europe 
because of certain interconnectivity between the European countries. This varies widely between 
the countries however, for example the Iberian Peninsula has poor grid capacity to the rest of 
Europe and the competition between Russian and Algerian gas is therefore weak in this region. 
 
According to Gas Analyst Emmanuel Soetaert, Algeria, Norway and Russia do not act like a cartel, 
but the situation is best characterized as an oligopoly. He argues that it is hard to prove any exertion 
of market power. 
 
As the dominant supplier to Europe, Russia has some market power alone. This market power may 
increase as some analysts believe that much of Europe’s gas supply gap will be covered by Russian 
piped gas, e.g. by the new pipeline under the Baltic Sea to Germany. Although the European 
Commission is working for diversification, several of the big energy companies in Europe are 
entering into new long-term agreements with Gazprom. Both E.ON Ruhrgas, GdF and ENI have 
recently signed large contracts with the Russians.74 These deals, together with the construction of 
the new pipeline in the Baltic Sea, indicate that Russia will increase exports to Europe. This is 
opposed by Tractebel Electricity and Gas International, which expects no increase in Russian gas 
supply to Europe the next decade.75 
 
One might imagine a global gas cartel, after the OPEC model. The creation of the Gas Exporting 
Countries Forum has spiked new worries over this possibility, and this will be treated in the next 
section. 
 
                                                 
73 Appendix 11.3 and 11.4 
74 Dagens Næringsliv, May 2007 
75 Tractebel (2002) 
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A factor restraining the market power of Russia, Algeria and Norway is that the EU has some 
market power on the buyer’s side. Although gas contracts are bilateral, the EU has a coordinated 
strong focus on energy supply. Moreover, certain member states are very large consumers. For 
instance, Germany is an important market for Russia, and Spain is an important market for Algeria. 
In countries which are not crucially dependent upon a single supplier, the buyer may also use its 
market power against suppliers. This happened in 1981 when the US forbade importers to receive 
Algerian LNG because Sonatrach attempted to increase prices. 
 
As natural gas is substitutable, especially in the longer term, the importing countries have a certain 
degree of market power. Although the European gas market today is a seller's market, there is 
competition from other fuels, especially in power generation, which leads to less market power in 
the longer term for the dominant gas exporters 
 
8.4. Potential forms of impact on the market 
Increasing LNG-imports may influence the market power of the current suppliers in two ways, 
through increased flexibility and by adding a significant volume. 
 
If one builds a pipeline from Russia to Belgium, the supplier will forever be Russia. If one builds an 
LNG reception terminal in Belgium, it may choose to import LNG from different and also distant 
sources. The reception terminal may also be expanded and start to import from other sources than 
those initially selected. Even though the reception terminal does not add large volumes to the 
market, it adds flexibility. 
 
As discussed earlier in this thesis, LNG may have the potential of supplying large volumes because 
of technological progress and economies of scale. IEA (2006) is predicting that Europe will be 
importing very substantial volumes of LNG by 2015. If new suppliers are able to gain a significant 
market share in the European gas market by supplying LNG, this will reduce the current suppliers' 
shares and consequently their market power. 
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8.5. Impact on the market power of Russia, Algeria and Norway 
LNG will increase flexibility in the market. As the LNG market develops with more terminals, 
more sources and shorter and more flexible contracts, buyers will have the possibility of switching 
some portion, although small, of their imported volumes to other suppliers. Flexibility will act like a 
partial safeguard against shortages, but without large volumes there are few reasons to believe that 
this low-volume flexibility will have a significant influence on the market power of the current 
suppliers. As the marginal costs of piped gas are low once the pipe is laid, European countries will 
continue to import high volumes from Norway and Russia. The market power of Algeria is more 
sensitive to increased flexibility as 1/3 of Algerian gas exports to Europe are as LNG. 
 
LNG will increase its market share of the total gas supply to Europe and total gas volumes delivered 
as LNG will increase. Large volumes of LNG from new suppliers will lower Russia's, Algeria's and 
Norway's market shares. Algeria may be able to maintain its share due to increasing exports both by 
pipeline and LNG. 
 
An increasing number of LNG-producers will theoretically give more upstream competition, thus 
weakening the position of the current three large suppliers. However, as noted in section 4, 
European indigenous production is declining and if the LNG from new suppliers only is able to 
make up for this decline, the market shares of the current suppliers will remain the same. 
 
The most important issue for Europe will be whether Russia will be able to maintain or increase its 
market power. As discussed earlier in this thesis there is little potential for new pipeline supplies 
and the LNG from Shtokman seems to be bound for the US. The increase in the use of LNG will 
therefore only have the potential of decreasing Russia’s market power. 
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8.6. Potential market power of new suppliers 
More suppliers should give more upstream competition and less market power for any single 
producer. However, this can be avoided by the suppliers by forming a cartel like OPEC or by tacit 
collusion. 
 
In 2001, several gas exporting countries set up an organisation called the Gas Exporting Countries 
Forum (GEFC). The organisation was established at a time of over-supply of natural gas and it was 
supposed to be a forum in which the exporters could discuss technology, trade and pricing. The 
creation of this forum raised concerns in many importing countries over the possibility that it might 
become a gas-OPEC, behaving like a cartel and restricting production in order to increase the gas 
price. OPEC was not able to control the oil price in the long term, but it had strong control in the 
short term, as it exercised in 1973 in protest of the Yom Kippur war. OPEC is today believed to 
have only limited, or no, control of the oil price, as it currently organizes a smaller part of total oil 
production than earlier. If OPEC was to regain power over the oil price, it would simultaneously 
gain some control over gas prices as well because gas contracts are formally linked to the oil price. 
 
There are fewer gas producers than oil producers in the world, so coordination should be less 
difficult among the gas producers than among the oil producers. On the other hand, natural gas is 
easier to substitute than oil products because the latter is close to impossible to substitute in the 
short and medium term as fuel for vehicles. 
 
Current members of GEFC include Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, 
Iran, Oman, Qatar, the United Arab Emirates, Algeria, Nigeria, Egypt and Libya. In addition, 
Norway attends the meetings as an observer. Venezuela is not yet exporting gas, but has aspirations 
of starting to. The forum has invited importing countries to become members, but no such countries 
have yet accepted the invitation.76 Currently there are probably too many members with diverging 
views for a cartel to be effective. 
 
The focus of GEFC is reportedly shifting towards LNG. Most of the important LNG-exporters of 
the world are members of the forum, and the GEFC members provide 90% of the world's LNG 
exports. However, the potential for price coordination is currently low because LNG makes up only 
a small fraction of total energy use and it is relatively uncomplicated to substitute LNG by piped 
gas, oil and other fuels. 
                                                 
76 Hallouche (2006) 
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At the moment GEFC is characterized by significant uncertainty regarding its future role, goals and 
even existence. It does not have any formal ties to OPEC. Thus it seems unlikely that it will turn 
into a cartel in the coming years. This may change if the gas and LNG markets enter a period of 
over-supply and a subsequent price decrease. It may also happen that some GEFC members form 
sub-groups in order to try to obtain market power by coordination. One such group might be 
Algeria, Iran and Qatar which have been the driving countries in GEFC and which are all OPEC-
members. By now they have a relatively small market share, but this may change if Qatar continues 
its ambitious LNG development and Iran initiates one. 
 
Recently, the fears of a Gas OPEC have been renewed because of recent statements by Russian 
officials. Iran has been trying to persuade Russia to participate in coordinating gas exports, and it is 
assumed that Venezuela, Algeria and Qatar are interested in closer coordination. The Russian 
president, Vladimir Putin, has stated that the idea of a gas-OPEC is interesting, and the head of 
Gazprom was among the participants at GEFC's meeting in Qatar in April 2007. 
 
As a conclusion, there are currently few concrete signs of GEFC developing into a gas-OPEC soon, 
but there is a process going on which has the potential of leading to a gas-OPEC if or when the gas 
market makes this favourable for the most powerful suppliers. 
 
The conclusion that the chances of a formal gas cartel, like OPEC is for oil, are relatively small in 
the current situation may change rapidly in the case of serious over-supply. A potential gas cartel 
may get a strong position in the LNG market, as there are relatively few LNG suppliers that have a 
large combined market share and the GEFC members currently supply 90% of the world’s LNG. 
 
As shown in 8.2.3 a cartel can gain substantial market power in a market with inelastic supply and 
demand. The short-run gas supply will be inelastic and the short-run demand will also be inelastic, 
although probably not as inelastic as the demand for oil. The reason for this is that gas is easier to 
substitute than oil products, especially gasoline. Gas demand is inelastic enough, however, to make 
the analysis from section 8.2.3 relevant for the gas market. Thus, the potential power of a gas cartel 
can be strong, and a serious threat to the European importers. However, this conclusion will only be 
valid in the short or medium term. The reason is that gas has several substitutes and in the long term 
the market will regain balance, like the oil market has done after OPEC lost much of its power in 
the eighties. 
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9. Conclusions 
European indigenous gas production is declining. Few new discoveries are made, with a consequent 
decline in reserves, and EU25 now holds only 1.4% of total known gas resources. With the current 
production level, EU25 will have consumed its reserves in 13 years, without new discoveries. The 
large gas reservoirs are to be found in the Middle East, Russia and Africa. These facts all make a 
strong case for stronger import dependency in Europe over the coming years, an import dependency 
which is already high. 
 
The high, and growing, import dependence is a great concern for several European countries. 
Today, Western Europe’s three largest import sources, Russia, Norway and Algeria, account for 
89% of total imports. This is a concern for two reasons. Firstly, security of supply will be more 
difficult to ensure when there are few alternative sources. Secondly, the exporters may gain 
substantial market power. 
 
The need for new gas supplies stems not only from decreasing production, but also from firm 
increase in demand. Natural gas is becoming more profitable as a fuel for electricity generation. Gas 
fired power plants produce twice the electricity per ton of CO2 emitted compared to coal fired 
plants. The CO2-quota scheme imposes substantial costs on generating electricity from coal instead 
of gas. Moreover, gas fired plants are more flexible with regards to adjusting production to 
electricity prices and can thus charge a higher average price than inflexible production like nuclear 
and coal. Increasingly, gas is used for direct household consumption. 
 
Assuming no large discoveries are made in the North Sea, the decrease in production and growth in 
demand will lead to a significant increase in imports. Some of this might be supplied by pipeline 
from Norway and Russia, but by far not enough to cover the supply gap. This supply gap can be 
covered by gas transported by either pipeline or in the form of LNG, Liquefied Natural Gas. Given 
the anticipated substantial increase in gas demand, LNG will be of crucial importance in order to 
balance the market.  
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The LNG value chain requires large investments and LNG is only profitable compared to pipeline 
on long distances and/or in small volumes. In addition, LNG is far more flexible as it is possible to 
change supplier or receiver without making the entire investment over again. Flexibility is being 
enhanced by new market mechanisms and more short-term volumes in the market. 
 
Technological progress has made LNG competitive with pipelines on increasingly shorter distances, 
and many of the potential new gas sources are situated relatively far from Europe, e.g. Nigeria, 
Qatar, Oman and Trinidad and Tobago. Furthermore, LNG transportation can be done in 
international waters and need not cross several borders and conflict areas, which is often a problem 
with pipelines. The formal analysis has shown that import restrictions on low-costs suppliers like 
Russia, and in the case of Spain; Algeria, have significant impact on the supply mix. Security of 
supply considerations will benefit the use of LNG in Europe. 
 
The risks are high in LNG projects, so there will probably not be over-capacity in reception 
terminals. However, the market recognises the advantages of LNG and heavy investments are being 
made in liquefaction, shipping and reception terminals. Spain, Italy, Belgium, France and the UK 
have large projects under way. Furthermore, LNG exporting countries are investing heavily in 
production capacity. Especially countries in the Middle East are expected to become significant 
suppliers. 
 
Europe will face competition for new LNG supplies. Demand for gas and LNG is increasing sharply 
in the US and several reception terminals are under construction. Europe has a substantial cost 
advantage over the US because Europe is situated closer to potential major sources such as North 
and West Africa and the Middle East. However, the US possesses the financial and political 
strength to attract a substantial part of new supplies. 
 
The final conclusion is that European consumption of LNG will increase strongly over the coming 
years. This consumption growth will be made possible by imports from the Middle East and Africa. 
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The increase in LNG imports from new suppliers will influence the market power of the current 
major suppliers. 
 
Currently, Algeria, Russia and Norway supply almost 90% of Europe’s gas imports. With the 
partial exception of Norway, they are characterized by having one large state-owned gas company 
that markets the gas by using bilateral agreements and long-term contracts. 
 
The three major suppliers constitute an oligopoly, with a certain degree of oligopoly power. This 
oligopoly has characteristics of a natural oligopoly because they are the only suppliers that have 
been blessed with large gas resources within convenient distance of the European market. 
Decreasing LNG costs weaken this natural oligopoly. 
 
Today, there is probably little direct coordination of prices and output between the suppliers. Still, 
the oligopoly situation enables them, in theory, to engage in tacit collusion. Whether they do that or 
not is hard to prove, but it is probable that they gain a certain oligopoly premium. This is not large, 
however, because of substitution possibilities between gas and fuel oil in the short term and 
between gas and coal and nuclear in the longer term. 
 
The increased use of LNG will reduce the current suppliers’ market power through two effects. 
More flexibility will increase substitution possibilities, but this will only have a minor effect on the 
market power. A more important effect will be that substantial volumes from new suppliers will 
decrease the market share of the current suppliers, and consequently their market power. This 
conclusion assumes that the new suppliers do not organize a cartel. A gas cartel like OPEC for oil 
does not seem likely at the moment, but this might change if prices and profitability slide. 
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11. Appendices 
11.1. Abbreviations 
 
Btu = British thermal units (energy content)  
 
Mmbtu = one million Btu’s 
 
bcm = Billion Cubic Meters 
 
tcm = Trillion Cubic Meters 
 
Cm = Cubic Meters 
 
Mtpa = Million ton per annum 
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11.2. European LNG reception terminals 
bcm/year 1000cm lng
Location Gas Storage Supplying countries Shareholders Start year
SPAIN
Barcelona 10,5 160
Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Australia, 
Brunei, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, 
Qatar, Trinidad&Tobago ENAGAS 1969
   - expansion 4 150 2005
   - expansion 1,3 150
Sagunto (Valencia) 6,6 300 Qatar Union Fenosa, Iberdrola, Endesa 2006
   - expansion 4,8 300
Reganosa 300 Algerie, Middle East Union Fenosa, Sonatrach, Endesa 2007
Bilbao 7,4 300
Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Australia, 
Nigeria,Qatar,Trinidad&Tobago Bahia de Bizkaia 2003
   - expansion 3,5 150
Cartagena 7,9 287
Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Australia, 
Brunei, Libya, Nigeria, Oman, 
Qatar, Trinidad&Tobago ENAGAS 1989
   - expansion 1,3 150 2007
Huelva 7,9 310
Abu Dhabi, Algeria, Australia, 
Brunei, Libya, Nigeria ENAGAS 1988
   - expansion 2,9 150 2007
El Ferrol (Mugardos) 3,6 300 Algerie Regasificadora de noroeste 2006
ITALY
Isola di porto levante 8 152 Qatar QP, exxon, edison 2008
La Spezia 3,9 100 Algeria GNL, SNAM, ENEL 1971
   - expansion 2007
Edison LNG - rivigo 8 250 QP, exxon, edison 2007
   - expansion
Brindisi 8 320 Egypt BG 2010
   - expansion 8 320 2012
Livorno 3 Edison, Solvay, BP 2007
San ferdinando 6-12 Falck
Livorno offshore 3,6 2008
PORTUGAL
Sines 5,5 240 Nigeria Galp Energia 2003
   - expansion 3 140 2007
NETHERLANDS
Lion Gas 6 495 4gas 2009
Maasvlakte 6 2010
GREECE
Revithoussa 2,3 130 Algeria DEPA 2000
   - expansion 4,2 2007
GERMANY
Wilhelmshaven 10 E.on 2010
BELGIUM
Zeebrugge 4,5 261 Algeria until 2007 Fluxys LNG 1987
   - expansion 4,5 140 Qatar from 2007 1987 expansion 2007 2007
FRANCE
Fos Cavaou 8,25 330 Egypt Gdf 2007
   - expansion
Fos-sur-Mer 4,5 150 Algeria Gdf 1972
Montoir-de-Bretagne 10,2 360
Algeria,Nigeria, Oman, Abu 
Dhabi, Qatar Gdf 1982
   - expansion
Le verdon 2-3 Total 2010
UK
South hook LNG 10,5 460 Qatar qp, exxon 2008
   - expansion 10,5 310 2010
Dragon LNG 6 336 Trinidad&Tobago, Egypt bg, petronas, petroplus 2007
   - expansion 3 168
Isle of Grain 4,9 200 Algeria Grain LNG 2005
   - expansion 4,7 570 2008
Canvey island 5,4 240 2010
 
Various sources, mainly King and Spalding (2006) 
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